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5A note on intended use
This report is not intended as a practical guide to the evaluation of online influence activities.One of the main arguments presented here is that the design of effective and usable evaluationtechnologies requires end-user involvement. Rather, the purpose of this document is to inform,on the one hand, planners confronted with the issue of whether or not to undertake significantcapability-building for influence activities, and, on the other, evaluation and operation designersfaced with the task of improving the conduct of these activities.
ReferencingTo streamline the reading experience, this report is not referenced as systematically as adocument for academic publication would be. Nevertheless, significant portions of the followingsections were synthesised from, or refer to, material authored by other scholars. Unlessotherwise indicated in the text, this material is referenced as ‘Further reading’ at the end of eachsection.
6Synopsis
Aims of the present reportThe need for robust evaluation goes hand-in-hand with the undertaking of purposeful activity byhierarchical organisations with responsibility for multiple and competing tasks. Unfortunately,there is no such a thing as a standard design for the evaluation of human social activity, of whichonline influence activities (OIAs) are an example. Any evaluation design must be tailored to thespecific activity under evaluation. To guide the appropriate design of evaluations, a framework isneeded: a step-by-step process for operation and evaluation designers to follow. This reportpresents a rationale and blueprint for such a framework, by drawing upon the knowledge-basein crime prevention evaluation (CPE).
The challenges of evaluationThe problems facing the evaluation of OIAs are of four types:
 The problem of attribution: Evaluators must establish whether any change observed inthe wake of an operation was caused by the operation’s activity, rather than some otherfactor, as well as provide concrete measures of this change.
 The problem of generalisation: Evaluators have to establish how and why an operationsucceeded or failed, in order to produce knowledge that will be of benefit to futureoperations implemented in different contexts.
 The problem of analysis: Evaluators have to keep track of (positive or negative) ‘knock-on’ effects, which accompany the implementation of operations in open social systems atdifferent levels of analysis (e.g. individual level or community level).
 The problem of usability: Evaluation designs have to be usable given resources availableto the organisation and the conditions under which operations take place. Robustness(the extent to which an evaluation design deals successfully with the first threeproblems) must be balanced against user needs.In dealing with these challenges, it is worth looking to lessons learned in CPE. OIAevaluators can avoid retreading old ground, both in terms of questions already answered andmistakes already made.
7Evidence-based vs. realist evaluationTwo competitive approaches to evaluation have emerged in CPE, as well as in other problemdomains.
Evidence-Based Evaluation (EBE) privileges tackling the problem of attribution. It does soby advocating that evaluations should be designed on the model of Randomised ControlledTrials (RCT). A well-designed RCT will maximise the internal validity of the evaluation’s findings,establishing with a high level of confidence whether the intervention was responsible, or not, forthe changes observed.EBE has been criticised for neglecting the problem of generalisation, inasmuch as RCTsmean to rule out confounding factors, such as individual differences and contextual variations.Yet these kinds of factors are likely to interact with the intervention in such a way that the sameintervention implemented on a different population in another context will produce verydifferent results. EBE is also criticised for neglecting the problem of usability. Carrying out anRCT is resource-intensive and requires the ability to impose artificial conditions upon theevaluated activity, which may be difficult to achieve when evaluating operations ‘on the ground’.Approaches to influence activity evaluation which rely chiefly on gathering Measures of
Effectiveness (MOEs) are closest in intent to the EBE approach, though they do not get close to itsmethodological orthodoxy.By contrast, Realist Evaluation (RE) puts a premium on tackling the problem ofgeneralisation. Realists argue that evaluation should not stop at establishing ‘what works’ byproducing valid MOEs, but ‘what works, for whom, in what circumstances’, in order tostrengthen the external validity of the evaluation. MOEs collected in one context will not providegrounds upon which to anticipate with confidence how an operation will fare if implemented inanother. Realist evaluators strive to uncover the theoretical assumptions which underpin anintervention’s design. They make educated guesses about the mechanisms which link theoperations ‘key ingredients’ to the operation’s outcomes. Without positing these mechanisms,the evaluator cannot draw lessons relevant to future operations. RE recognises that initiativesare implemented in open social systems, which are characterised by complexity andpermeability. It is the realist evaluator’s job to identify those systemic factors which interactwith the intervention’s activity to produce operational outcomes.RE has been criticised for encouraging evaluators to eschew experimental methods,therefore not being able to establish that the intervention is responsible for change with asufficient degree of confidence. Furthermore, while RE prioritises the generation of Context-Mechanism-Outcome configurations – which, according to the approach, make up thegeneralisable product of any evaluation – the notion of 'context' remains under-conceptualised,undermining the value of the approach as a robust and reliable evaluation framework.
A systemist approach to the problem of analysisSystemism is an approach elaborated specifically in recognition that human social activity takesplace within systems. These systems can be analysed with attention to their composition,
environment, structure, and mechanisms, all of which are aspects of a system capable of
8interacting with an operation’s mechanism(s). Systemic analytical products, which articulateSystem-Mechanism-Outcome configurations could be used to strengthen a realist approach,substituting the ill-defined notion of ‘context’ for that of ‘system’.Given that operations can only be as good as the theories that drive them, the theories andmodels which make up the OIA knowledge-base should, like the operations themselves, beevaluated for fitness. Without a knowledge-base that is fit-for-purpose, IAs risk being irrelevantand ineffective at best, or counterproductive and damaging at worst.
Overcoming the problem of usabilityRecognising that both of the mainstream approaches to evaluation – EBE and RE – have theirlimitations does not mean that any approach to OIA evaluation is condemned to choose betweentheir respective limitations. These seemingly irreconcilable differences between EBE and REstem from a category error: their proponents have historically treated evaluation as a scientificendeavour, when it is in fact a technological endeavour; hence, an engineering problem. Whilethe goal of scientists is to maximise the internal and external validity of their research designs,the goal of engineers is to meet the requirements of the users of the systems that they design.So far, evaluation has largely been treated as a scientific problem. The trade-off between theinternal and external validity of evaluation designs implemented in complex open social systemshas, therefore, appeared intractable. If, however, evaluation design is approached as anengineering problem, the task becomes one of eliciting requirements from users (OIAcommissioners, designers and implementers) and setting out specifications for an evaluationdesign which balances optimally the trade-offs between these requirements.Hence, there can be no one-size-fits-all or ‘gold-standard’ evaluation design. For any givenoperation, evaluators must produce a design which:
 delivers optimal measures of operational impact;
 captures operational inputs and outputs faithfully;
 eliminates the greatest number of impediments to the establishment of causalattribution (internal validity);
 provides an understanding of the processes involved in producing the outcome,including the circumstances in which these mechanisms are likely to work again(external validity);
 is usable in an operational environment.In practice, such a design is likely to involve quantitative and qualitative mixed researchmethods, with element of both summative and process evaluation.
9The need for an R&D programmeIf evaluation is a technological endeavour, then effective OIA evaluation technologies – and, bylogical extension, influence technologies – must be the product of a research and development(R&D) process. The technological rules produced by the R&D activity will address both thenature of problems and their solutions, and the tools and processes used to put these solutioninto action.In the first instance, System-Mechanism-Outcome patterns uncovered by the evaluationwill be formalised into heuristic rules. In the second instance, the rules will state which tools ormeans to employ to assist in the design and implementation of the solution. In the third instance,evaluation is likely, in the long run, to generate meta-technological rules about the effectivenessof certain classes of solutions against certain families of problems in certain families of systems.
A systemist evaluation framework for OIAsA formative approach to evaluation is a flexible foundation for such an R&D process. Formativeevaluations are conducted at the developmental stage of a new kind of activity, when there isinsufficient knowledge about what sorts of operations might be effective, or even what,precisely, the activity is setting out to achieve. Formative evaluations encourage structured self-reflection about the nature of problems and ultimate objectives, as well as the development ofinnovative solutions. The process is very similar to requirements elicitation processes insystems engineering. It requires close collaboration between operation designers andimplementers, and evaluators with an expert understanding of the influence knowledge-base.Undertaking systemist formative evaluations is necessary to:
 elaborate well-posed problem statements (i.e. solvable problems, which areappropriately matched to tactical or strategic objectives);
 pinpoint and synthesise the relevant knowledge-base;
 elicit functional and non-functional requirements;
 set out specifications for influence technologies;
 generate explicit S-M-O configurations;
 delineate the pool of realistic interventions; and
 produce technological rules for the design of future evaluation and implementation tools.The key steps involved in such a formative systemist evaluation process model aredetailed in the penultimate section of the report, with plausible R&D activities suggested foreach stage.
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ConclusionsAll four challenges of evaluation – attribution, generalisation, analysis, and usability – must betackled if influence technologies are to become more efficient and more reliable. While it ispossible to design functional, minimally-intrusive, MOE-based evaluations, this is not theapproach to take when aiming for capability building on any significant scale.Taking an engineering approach to the design of influence technologies will, however, leadto confronting a number of assumptions:
 It will challenge the idea that operation designers can go straight to theoretical modelsand empirical research in the basic or applied sciences – such as social psychology, socialnetworking or decision theories – and put these findings to use without further ado.
RECOMMENDATION: When commissioning, soliciting or turning to the products of
research and theoretical development in the human and social sciences, users
should keep in mind that these products need to be assessed against user
requirements, both functional and non-functional, as would any other new
technological system, prior to implementation.
 The notions of behavioural change which underpin current thinking on influence havetheir roots in thirty-year-old literature and need a significant update. Rigorous problemanalysis and the subsequent synthesis of relevant knowledge-bases are likely tochallenge the received wisdom that influence activities are and should be chiefly aboutchanging ‘attitudes’. A shift towards multi-level, integrated behavioural models is likelyto take place, to reflect the state-of-the-art in the behavioural sciences. R&D activity mayreveal ultimately that investment in basic science is required before influence models fitto drive OIAs can emerge.
RECOMMENDATION: MOD should commission systemic syntheses of the literature
on behavioural change in commensurate domains, which reflect the state-of-the-
art in social environmental and ecological science, social cognitive neuroscience,
and other systemic understandings of human behaviour, in order to generate new
analytical frameworks for IO design, which do not rely outdated attitude-change
models.
 Finally, a systemist outlook can only challenge expectations, if any remain, that IOs canachieve their objectives regardless of what goes on ‘out there’. In open social systems,actions are as loud as words, if not louder.
RECOMMENDATION: Building confidence in OIAs means, first and foremost,
managing expectations of what they can achieve.
The next stage is to subject the blueprint of the systemist evaluation process model tofurther development, alpha-testing and fine-tuning, as a first step towards devising a coherent
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R&D programme for influence technologies. Whether that course of action is desirable is not forthe author to say. The present report can only aim to inform that decision.
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Abbreviations
CBA Cost-Benefit Analysis
CP Crime Prevention
EBE Evidence-Based Evaluation
IA Influence Activity
IO Influence Operation
MoE Measure of Effectiveness
OIA Online Influence Activity
QE Quasi Experiment
RCM Rational Choice Model
RCT Randomised Control Trial
SCP Situational Crime Prevention
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SECTION 1
Introduction: The challenges faced
by evaluation activities
The ubiquitous expansion of the Internet andwidespread diffusion of digital technologieshas unleashed the potential for influenceactivities to be carried out in the cyberenvironment, as a complement to kineticoperations or on their own.When purposeful activity is undertakenby a hierarchical organisation charged withresponding to multiple and often competingtasks, the need for evaluation is unavoidable.Planners, operation designers, commandersand implementers seek answers to suchquestions as:
 How do we go about identifying
appropriate and achievable objectives?
 How do we go about designing an
effective operation?
 How can the success or failure of the
operation be convincingly demonstrated
or measured?
 How do we explain success or failure?
 How sure are we that the operation was
responsible for the changes observed?
 Would the same operation, implemented
in another context, with a different
target audience, produce the same
outcome?
“The emphasis of military operations is
shifting more and more towards non-
kinetic activities, such as Psychological
Operations and Information
Operations, which are geared towards
influencing attitudes and behaviors of
specific target audiences.
Though many such activities are
undertaken, there is little systematic
evaluation of the effects they bring
about and their effectiveness. As a
result, it is not well known what these
operations contribute to the overall
operation and to what degree they are
achieving their goals.”
NATO, 2011
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 Would a different kind of operation (a cheaper one, perhaps) have done just as
well?
 What transferrable lessons, if any, can be drawn from success or failure?
 Were there any unintended or unforeseen consequences?
 Could we have done more to anticipate these side-effects?
 In the long term, should this type of activity be a major or a minor component of
the organisation’s strategic portfolio of intervention technologies?
 Should it be abandoned entirely?
Such questions have long been the concern of planners and intervention designers indomains as diverse as civil engineering, public health, commercial marketing, and crimeprevention (CP).In CP, the development of scientific evaluation framework has been accompanied by acorresponding improvement in the elaboration of theories, counter-measures, and strategies forcrime reduction. As knowledge accrues as a result of evaluation activity, it also becomes possibleto better motivate and justify the requisition of resources, with a greater degree of transparencyand accountability.Evaluation is the ultimate test of the ideas and techniques which underpin operations: the
more robust the evaluation process, the more robust the ideas and techniques which survive the
evaluation hurdle, and – as evolutionary logic would have it – the more robust the operations.It is expected that a similar, virtuous feedback loop would accompany the improvement ofevaluation practices in the domain of influence activities (IAs) generally, and online influenceactivities (OIAs) in particular.
Four key challenges can be identified at the outset, which must be overcome if one is tocarry out efficient evaluations and design effective OIAs.
1. Evaluations must establish with confidence whether operations areresponsible for the changes (outcomes) observed in the aftermath of IAs, aswell as concretely measure these outcomes. This means that evaluations mustproduce solid evidence that success or failure is attributable to the operationbeing evaluated.This is the problem of attribution.
2. Evaluations must generate knowledge which contributes to the improvementof future operations, even if these operations are implemented in differentcontexts, target different audiences, or convey different messages thanoperations subject to evaluation in the past. This requires that evaluations notonly produce solid evidence of failure or success, but that they uncover thereasons behind these results. If we know why a particular operation
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succeeded or failed in a particular context, it becomes possible to adjust thedesign of future operations in light of that knowledge.This is the problem of generalisation.
3. Operations are always implemented in ‘open social systems’, rather than inclosed environments (such as a lab). Social systems are characterised by theirpermeability (they are acted upon by, and in turn act upon, other socialsystems). They are found at different levels of analysis (e.g. micro, meso, ormacro level). To be useful to planners, evaluations must not only keep track ofpermeability effects (e.g. ‘knock-on effects’ of activity carried out in onesystem upon the components of another), but they must help us think throughwhat will happen if an operation carried out at a micro level (e.g. influencing ahandful of individuals) were implemented at another level (e.g. influencing acommunity).This is the problem of analysis.
4. Evaluation is not an abstract activity. Like the operations themselves,evaluations must be implemented: they are carried out by people with variouslevels of training, in often less-than-ideal circumstances, absent the kind ofcontrol over means of data collection and response elicitation that a scientistwould otherwise take for granted. This means that, while evaluations muststrive to be robust (i.e. they must strive to tackle effectively the first threechallenges), evaluation frameworks and designs must also be sensitive to userneeds (e.g. the reality ‘on the ground’). Evaluation designs which are toodifficult to put into practice will be discarded or improperly implemented byend-users and the evaluation activity will fail, regardless of how well it dealtwith the issues of attribution, generalisation and analysis on paper.This is the problem of usability.
This report addresses each of these challenges in turn, through the lens of experience inCP. The intent is not to claim that the example of CP should be followed slavishly. Rather, thereport highlights both the strengths and the weaknesses of CP evaluation frameworks, which arerepresentative of issues faced by most areas of activity concerned with human change. The goalis to avoid rethreading old ground – both in terms of questions already answered and mistakesalready made – in the course of developing an evaluation model for OIAs.
However, the report does not confine itself to a review of the ‘state-of-play’ in CP. Instead,it advocates combining the insights of competing approaches. Chiefly, it argues that while robustmeasures of effectiveness (MoEs) are necessary, they are not a sufficient component ofevaluation. MoEs may tell us that something worked, not why it did. Yet establishing ‘why’ is aprerequisite to knowledge transfer between operations. As much as it needs valid MoEs,collected through robust designs, evaluation activity also requires sound theory, in order toprovide grounds for generalisation as well as attribution.
16
Furthermore, solutions are proposed to address the shortcomings of CP evaluationframeworks, notably the neglected problem of analysis. The foundations of a formativeevaluation process model for IO evaluation are laid out, rooted in an approach – systemism –whose main purpose is to structure our understanding of human action in open social systems.Finally, it is suggested that the unproductive tension between those who would privilegeattribution and those who believe that the chief purpose of evaluation is to producegeneralisable knowledge can be overcome through a simple paradigm shift: While, traditionally,evaluation has been treated as a scientific endeavour, it is in fact an engineering problem.Evaluations, like influence operations, are technologies, not scientific projects. They should,therefore, be evaluated according to how well they satisfy user needs.The entire problem-cycle of problem statement, problem analysis, operation design,implementation and evaluation must be subject to research and development, including,notably, the elicitation of user requirements. Only through this process can the last hurdle,
usability, be overcome.
A systematic, fit-for-purpose, ambitious R&D programme must be devised if the capability to
undertake strategic, effective and sustained influence activity is to be achieved.Whether building that capability is desirable is beyond the scope of this report and left asan open question for the reader.
Structure of the reportSection 2 sets out the rationale for drawing from CP to inform progress in IA, bydemonstrating notably that both domains face similar challenges. Section 3 provides anoverview of the literature on IA evaluation and identifies outstanding, critical issues, which areaddressed in the remainder of the report. Following a brief introduction to CP, Section 4describes the evidence-based approach to evaluation, which aims to tackle the problem ofattribution. Its relative neglect of the problem of generalisation is addressed by the realistevaluation framework, presented at lengths in Section 5.While the realists’ framing of evaluation activity in terms of the elicitation of context-specific, mechanism-based explanations is of arguable value to OIAs, their handling of theproblem of analysis isn’t robust enough to support operations in highly permeable systems, suchas cyber environments. Section 6 introduces an analytical approach, systemism, which canaddress this shortcoming, while Section 7 sets out criteria to assess a knowledge-base that canbest support the design of IOs. Section 8 describes the main families of evaluation designs interms of their ability to tackle the four challenges of evaluation, making the case that none yetexplicitly address the issue of usability, without which everything else is moot.In Section 9, it is proposed that evaluation be recast properly as a technologicalendeavour, and that influence technologies should be the outcome of a research anddevelopment process, as are technologies in other domains of operation. The foundations of asystemist evaluation process model are laid out in Section 10. The report concludes in Section11, where it is argued that strategic capability-building for influence activities will require theimplementation of such an ambitious, systematic, and rational research and developmentprogramme for influence technologies.
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SECTION 2
Why transfer knowledge from crime
prevention?
A very short history of influenceInfluence activities are socio-technical interventions which aim to change the behaviour of anindividual, group or population, in support of a strategic, tactical or operational objective. IAsare, traditionally, carried out without recourse to the use of force or other means of coercion.Historically, such activities have taken the form of loudspeaker or radio broadcasts andairborne leafleting by both Axis and Allied forces during World War II, as a means to sway themorale of enemy troupes or to spread factual information among civilian populations. Morerecently, influence operations (IOs) have been associated with the so-called ‘Winning Hearts andMinds’ strategy, rolled out alongside military action in the theatres of Iraq and Afghanistan.A succession of recent asymmetric conflicts has driven home the need to win over alliesand defeat opponents on the field of ideas, and to exercise soft power as often as military might.The established role of small groups of radicalised supporters in the resurgence of deadlyterrorist campaigns on home soil and overseas has also highlighted the potential of targetedcounter-influence operations for the purpose of intelligence-gathering, disinformation,disruption, and neutralisation of terrorist networks.
Harnessing the cyber environmentThe cyber environment has been identified in successive government publications as a staging-ground for a new generation of threats to national security1. However, the internet is also amedium which can be exploited for the purpose of defence, to notable advantage.In a world where strategic communication is often key to diplomatic success abroad andto securing popular support and material resources at home, the notion that versatile influenceprogrammes could harness modern communication techniques and exploit the ever-wideningreach of online social networking platforms has been gaining ground.
1 See, notably, Cabinet Office (2011).
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While traditional propaganda operations were often restricted to a geographical area, theinternet enables messages to be conveyed regardless of international borders, straight intohomes. Furthermore, the internet is a rich medium for information dissemination. It allows forimmediate feedback, offers a range of methods for message diffusion (e.g. video, as well as text),and the opportunity for interaction and personalisation. Online delivery is also cost-effectivecompared to face-to-face interventions, with the added benefits of privacy and anonymity toparticipants2.Yet, although the internet is an attractive medium for influence, one of its chief benefits isalso an important limitation: while messages can be disseminated remotely and reach widely,any impact of this diffusion may go unseen or be very difficult to attribute with any certitude.This is one of the challenges of OIA evaluation: how can we go about measuring and
demonstrating the impact of influence activity carried out online?
Old wine, new bottles?Influence activity can be overt or covert, broad or limited in scope, and now, online or off.Whether the exercise of influence in a cyber-environment is an essentially different kind ofendeavour from the exercise of influence offline isn’t the main concern of this report, though thequestion must inevitably be raised.The temptation can be great to jettison everything we know under the reasoning thatanything ‘cyber’ must inevitably be novel, and that a new knowledge-base should be built fromscratch. However, experience in other domains would suggest that people are people, and whileenvironments change and technologies evolve, some rules continue to apply and recognisablepatterns continue to emerge.For example: while the transport revolution ushered in by the invention and diffusion ofthe automobile gave rise to new forms of crime, people continue to steal cars for broadly thesame reasons that they used to steal horses, and they continue to prefer to commit their crimes ashort walk from home.While the particulars of problems and their solutions do change under the influence of theenvironment (e.g. RFID tagging has replaced horse branding), operating principles (e.g. propertyshould be marked in some lasting way so that it can be tracked if it is stolen) remain.In short: one should try not to lose sight of the old wine for the new bottles.
CP and OIAs face similar obstacles to progressCP owes many of its methodological and practical advances to fruitful imports from the domainsof clinical medicine and public health. Longitudinal studies, randomised controlled trials, andHaddon matrices have been successfully adapted to the investigation of the emergence of
2 See Lustria et al. (2009) and Bewick et al. (2008) for a discussion of web-based interventions in thecontext of health.
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criminal propensities in adolescents, the assessment of treatment effectiveness for seriousoffenders, or the development of prevention strategies in response to chronic episodes of sportsviolence, to name a few examples.When a domain of activity faces enduring obstacles to progress, it pays to turn to a
neighbouring knowledge domain for inspiration or guidance.OIAs face a number of such obstacles, including, but not limited to: an open environment; anewly emerging topic; difficult access to quality data; limited technical expertise amongpractitioners; finite material and financial resources; and an underdeveloped scientificknowledge-base. As a field of scientific inquiry, the ‘influence’ domain remains unsystematic,largely conceptual, and fragmented.This report is based on the premise that enough conceptual and technical areas of overlapexist between CP and IAs to justify drawing from the knowledge-base in CP, in order to informthe development of evaluation technologies in the influence domain. Areas of commonality,mainly in the guise of shared challenges, are summed up in Box 1.Although CP continues to face obstacles to evaluation, academics and practitioners havebeen addressing these challenges and proposing solutions for going on four decades and canboast the benefit of some valuable experience.
20
In the next section, the state of the IA evaluation knowledge-base is briefly assessed,followed by an overview of those CP evaluation frameworks which have set out to tackle theproblems of attribution and generalisation.
Box 1 Commonalities between OIAs and CP
Practitioners in both domains grapple with many of the same
challenges:
 They seek to influence individual, group and population behaviour for a specificpurpose
 Their activity may be targeted at audiences who are (sometimes staunchly)antagonistic and opposed to the intermediate or the ultimate goals of theinfluence programme
 They operate in ‘open systems’, which are subject to the influence of otheragents, groups and institutions
 They are involved in punctual operations, as well as large scale programmeswhich coordinate several smaller operations
 They need to demonstrate the effectiveness of their actions to secure furtherresources for action
 They are called on to measure intangible concepts in concrete ways (e.g. ‘fear ofcrime’, ‘satisfaction’, ‘influence’, ‘attitude’)
 They may be asked to carry out cost-benefit analyses, which translate successor failure in monetary terms
 They must minimize the unintended, negative consequences of their activity(e.g. ‘problem displacement’), and try to maximise unintended, but positiveconsequences (e.g. ‘diffusion of benefits’)
 They want to learn from past activity to improve future interventions
 They want to apply these lessons in different contexts, against different kinds ofproblems, with different target populations
 They may have to work in partnership with staff from other organisations,institutions or agencies in order to implement the activity
 They have to convince collaborators and decision-makers that evaluation is aworthwhile undertaking
 They have to convey their findings to a non-specialist audience in an accessibleway
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SECTION 3
Evaluating influence activities: A
brief overview of the state-of-play
In search of a ‘narrative of
effectiveness’ for IAsA survey of the IA literature suggests thattheory, practice and evaluation are still intheir relative infancy – both in terms of thebasic and applied science of influence, andof the development of protocols toimplement and evaluate IAs. This relativeunder-development is even more acutewhen one considers OIAs specifically.Arguably, the absence of a robustscience of influence (an accepted corpus ofwell-validated theories of cross-contextualbehavioural change) does much tocontribute to a lack of confidence in thevalue of IAs.As the case will be made later on,confidence in the effectiveness of atechnology requires the availability of anarrative of effectiveness: a believablestory of how and why the technologyshould work. Such a story is morebelievable if it ‘fits’ with already well-established stories. In other words, thenarrative of IAs must fit with the most up-to-date scientific understanding of theprocesses that shape human behaviour –an understanding which, itself, should besupported by well-articulated theories andan accumulation of empirical evidence.
“During World War 1 the allies flew
aircraft made of Balsa wood and fired
archaic weapons across No Man’s Land.
In 2012 the allies fly super-sonic stealth
aircraft and deliver precision weapons
from unmanned drones.
In World War 1 the allies dropped
MISO/PsyOps leaflets. In Afghanistan in
2012 ISAF drops MISO/PsyOps leaflets.
Unlike any other current military
capability MISO/PsyOps has not evolved
any substantial concept during the past
90 years.”
McKay et al., 2012
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Building such a narrative is a tall order. The science of human behaviour is an emerging,fragmented, and fast-changing field. Behavioural models can lack validation, often due to thedifficulty in accessing large amounts of high quality social and human data.In many fields (for example, criminology) several theories can compete, each seeming toprovide part of the explanation, yet none standing alone. Concepts are often insufficientlydefined. The problem is even more acute when one tries to synthesise knowledge acrossdifferent disciplines, where words such as ‘attitude’, ‘belief’, ‘motivation’, ‘disposition’,‘influence’, ‘persuasion’, ‘perception’ or ‘intent’ have different – at times incompatible –meanings.
Building a convincing narrative upon such uncertain foundations can seem a daunting task.
The limitations of current approaches to IA evaluationIn spite of the difficulty in building a narrative of effectiveness, a small number of more-or-lessdetailed frameworks or approaches to IA evaluation have been put forward.These frameworks address many of same, or related, points which will be elaborated uponfurther in this report, though the terminology may vary.This is unsurprising. Even a cursory overview of the evaluation literature across differentfields concerned with human change – from public health, to education, to commercial and socialmarketing – will bring to light the same basic elements, which are intrinsic to the evaluationendeavour:
 an understanding of the different kinds of evaluations which can beconducted, and their respective purpose;
 an awareness of problems of causality and attribution (thedemonstration that any given activity is responsible for the changebeing observed);
 the availability of data and the design of valid measures of impact;
 attention to the unintended consequences of the intervention; and,
 to varying degrees, articulation of the logic driving the activity.
Though most of these points are to some extent addressed, or at least acknowledged, bythe literature on IA evaluation, a number of issues remain outstanding. It is argued here thatthese issues are critical, not only for the development of robust evaluation frameworks, but alsofor the successful implementation of IAs overall.
 Conceptual fuzziness. Many frameworks appear to take for grantedthat inducing attitude change is the main mechanism underpinning IAs,yet few, if any, offer an operational definition of ‘attitude’, nor discussthe need for clear constructs more generally, including in the case ofconcepts as essential as ‘context of activity’.
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Without clear operational definitions, it is impossible to establishwith confidence which areas of basic and applied science should bedrawn upon to inform operation design, or which MoEs may adequatelycapture evidence of impact.
 A disorganised knowledge-base. While some reports, notably RAND’s,identify a social science knowledge-base which can serve as a guide forthe design of influence operations (IOs), it does not establish howtheories should be put to use to design IOs, nor upon which criteria thatknowledge-base should be assessed.In other words, it does not make explicit the qualities that aknowledge-base must have to support the design, implementation andevaluation of IAs. Such criteria must be established clearly if theknowledge-base is to grow in an organised, rather than a haphazard,fashion.This lack of assessment criteria may explain why the currentknowledge-base appears skewed towards rational choice models andattitude-change theories developed in the 1980s and 1990s3, ratherthan reflect more recent developments in, for example, social cognitiveneuroscience and human social ecology, which look at behaviour as theproduct of a situated process (person-environment interactionmodels)4.Indeed, the most detailed of the frameworks (NATO 2011),acknowledges that the relationship between attitude and behaviour isscientifically contested and complex, but offers no guidance as to howaddress this – rather fundamental – conceptual weakness. Furthermore,while the NATO process model advises ‘determining relevant contextualvariables’, it does not indicate on what basis this relevance should beestablished, other than, it seems, the analyst’s ‘common-sense’. Yetunderstanding and monitoring the impact of ‘context’ is likely to becrucial to any IO, especially those carried out in the cyber environment.An understanding of the place of basic science and appliedscientific knowledge in the cycle of activity development, as well asexplicit selection criteria, would progress the influence knowledge-basebeyond its outdated neglect of contextual factors and interaction effects,as well as provide guidance for problem analysis and solution design.
3 More recent literature is very much circumspect and nuanced about the causal relationship betweenattitude and behaviour. See, notably, Glasman and Albarracín (2006) for a meta-analysis of the factorswhich impact the attitude-influence relation.4 This state of affairs finds echo in the area of offender profiling, where reliance on outdated traitpsychology has undermined confidence in the utility and reliability of behavioural and crime sceneprofiling as an investigative technique. See, for example, Alison et al. (2002).
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 Lack of integration with operation design. The extent to which theevaluation activity should be integrated with the operation designactivity, and the mechanisms through which the former should feedback into the latter, are not clearly articulated. Yet it is through thesemechanisms that evaluation technologies can be counted on to improveoperational effectiveness, taking IOs beyond mere ‘craft’.Taking the NATO framework again as an example, operationsdesigners are advised to identify sources of data and evaluationsmethodologies before selecting a form of intervention, which seems torun counter to the logic of evaluation design in most other domains (i.e.the design, including data and methods, is selected to fit the operation,not the other way around).More crucially, the quasi-exclusive focus on developing MoEs failsto address the issue of knowledge transfer (the problem ofgeneralisation). The MoE approach fails to recognise that evaluationactivity must capture operation-context interaction effects. It is not clearwhat can be learned from the ‘MoE score’ of an IO carried out in onecontext, which can be turned into a ‘lesson learned’ for an IO carried outin another.
 Neglect of implementation. Although approaches to IA evaluationemphasise the need to improve the development of outcome measures,the same attention is not devoted to the monitoring of implementationand the development of output measures. Integration of theseimplementation measures into the product of evaluation activity isneglected. Yet, experience in CP shows that evaluating operationalimplementation as well as overall operational effectiveness is a corecomponent of evaluation activity.
 No long-term, capability-building programme. The open sourceliterature reviewed for this report outlines general principles for theconduct of evaluation, but it doesn’t offer guidelines for a long-termdevelopment programme. Yet, to build substantial confidence in IAsgenerally, and OIAs in particular, research and development processesand targets need to be set out.
These issues are addressed in the remainder of this report. The next section provides avery brief introduction to CP evaluation and the approach devised to deal with the problem ofattribution.
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SECTION 4
Evidence-based evaluation: Tackling
the problem of attribution
The crisis of confidence in CPThe notion that CP efforts should be evaluated scientifically gained traction as a result of thecrisis of confidence which CP initiatives, notably community policing activities undertaken bylaw enforcement units, suffered in the 1970s and 1980s.Bolstered by data from official crime statistics and victim surveys, which seemed to showthat few, if any, crime reduction initiatives had any effect at all, the argument that ‘nothingworked’ in CP – be it policing, incarceration, offender therapies or ambitious social changeprogrammes – started to gain strength. Not only was confidence in law enforcement and the CPagenda waning, but so was the belief that criminological research could ever produce knowledgethat would lead to concrete reductions in crime and criminality.This pessimistic view was eventually challenged in the 1980s and the early 1990s, aperiod which heralded three decades of intense development in policing and CP initiatives, withthe introduction of Problem-Oriented Policing (POP), ‘hot-spot’ policing, Crime PreventionThrough Environmental Design (CEPTED), Design Against Crime, and, last but not least,Situational Crime Prevention (SCP).The new approaches shared two broad tenets: first, that CP initiatives should tacklediscrete and well-analysed crime problems, rather than broad social issues; and, second, thatthey should move beyond targeting criminality towards targeting crime. In other words, lesseffort should be spent trying to prevent the emergence of criminality among the population(through social programmes and general deterrence) or reform career criminals (throughvarious approaches to treatment), and more on disrupting the immediate causes of crime events(for example, by removing opportunities for crime, such as through target hardening).Proponents of the ‘new wave’ reasoned that disrupting the immediate causes of crimeevents should have near-immediate effects. Not only would crime be reduced quickly andconcretely, but reduction would be more easily measurable, compared with programmes whosediffuse effects might be years in the making.
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From ‘gut-feeling’ to science-backed practiceWhile this shift in CP thinking was taking place, a new era of management was taking hold in thegovernance sphere, characterised by a target-oriented ethos. The performance of the police wasto be assessed through the ups and downs of crime statistics, in a way it had not been before. Inthe wake of these changes, a new culture spread, which privileged knowledge-based activitiesover experienced-based practice, and considered that success (or indeed failure) should beobjectively measurable.Not all of the CP approaches introduced during that period met with the same success onthe ground. Nevertheless, the idea that CP should, from then on, be based less on gut-feeling andanecdotal evidence, and more on science-backed practices took hold.5Evaluation became an exercise in the demonstration of effectiveness, whose ultimate aimwas to inform programme management practices, as well as rationalise investment in publicprogrammes, and, importantly, improve the overall CP knowledge-base.
The rise of evidence-based evaluation (EBE)In this endeavour, two (avowedly competitive) schools emerged, which sought to overcome theunproductive pessimism of ‘nothing works,’ in favour of the more pragmatic question ofestablishing ‘what works’.The first systematic evaluation tradition to be established in CP emerged out of the‘evidence-based policing’ movement championed by Lawrence Sherman and others. Thisapproach draws its philosophical and methodological inspiration from the practice of evaluationin medicine.As is best-practice in the medical field, evidence-based evaluation (EBE) puts the highestpremium on establishing internal validity. In other words, it seeks chiefly to establish with the
highest level of confidence achievable whether an initiative is responsible for changes observed,as opposed to something else. Above all else, EBE sets out to tackle the problem of attribution.Given inherent difficulties in establishing attribution, EBE advocates the use of thestrongest research designs, the most rigorous analytical methods, and the collection of the bestquantitative data available.Opting for a tightly-controlled experimental approach allows the evaluator to ‘confound’(rule out) other possible sources of influence. The randomised-control trial (RCT), whichinvolves the careful selection of study participants and their random allocation to treatment andcontrol groups, is considered the gold-standard in evidence-based evaluation design. Whileexacting to implement, RCTs provide the best measure of attribution and can be expected toproduce the best scientific evidence of ‘what works’ (and what doesn’t).IA evaluations which focus on the development and application of measures ofeffectiveness (MoEs) come close, in spirit, to EBE, though EBE proponents would criticise the
5 The bulk of the preceding discussion is drawn from Ellefsen (2011); see also Braga & Wiesburd (2006).
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lack of experimental methodology. Nevertheless, in both cases, the main objective is to capture a
quantitative a picture of ‘what worked’.
The ‘realist’ challengeWhat else could one demand of evaluations than they use the most advanced research methodsavailable and produce the best possible scientific evidence, putting solid numbers to oftennebulous effects?Yet another group of scholars began to question whether EBE’s almost slavish focus oninternal validity didn’t come at too high a price: the sacrifice of external validity.If internal validity measures the extent to which the treatment is responsible for theoutcome, external validity captures the extent to which findings are generalizable (i.e. the extentto which findings are relevant in settings other than the given evaluation setting).In other words, critics argued, it is not enough to say that the intervention was successfulin the case under evaluation; one wants to be able to say with some measure of confidence
whether the same intervention would be successful elsewhere. One of the main purposes ofevaluation, after all, is to inform future action, not just to assess current efforts.
As Lieberson and Horwich (2008:18) highlight:
“Granted, a well-executed randomized experiment provides the social researcher with a
strong basis for causal inference [attribution of the cause(s) of an outcome to one thing or
another]; but even then, a second issue is the broad range of possible conditions that operate to
affect the specific results from such an experiment. For example, in the case of the effect of a
training program, the experiment can tell the researcher what the effect is of the specific training
program on the specific subjects in a specific location. A wide variety of experiments would be
needed to work out [the broader range of] conditions [which could affect the results].”
In other words, establishing external validity involves replication: conducting the sameRCT at different times in different circumstances. The problem arises, of course, as to what to dowith the results when, as is often the case in CP (and elsewhere), an intervention that seems towork in one situation encounters less success, or altogether fails, in another.
More than just ‘what works’Critics of EBE, chief among them Nick Tilley, advocated a shift to a new perspective. CPinitiatives, they pointed out, are not carried out in the controlled environment of a laboratory,but implemented in messy, natural conditions.Day-to-day, CP activity doesn’t follow the strict guidelines of a scientific trial. And even if itdid, it is doubtful that the experimental assumptions inherent in RCTs could be met in the kindof natural setting (e.g. prison, court, gang, neighbourhood) where crime reduction activityusually takes place. Despite its proud scientific heritage, the ‘gold standard’ of RCT might not be
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suitable when evaluating interventions of a social nature6. Imposing robust but tightly controlledmethodologies on evaluations might produce reliable results, but it cannot tell us much abouthow the initiative would ‘behave’ if it were rolled out and ‘routinised’ in a variety ofenvironments and upon a diverse population.Hence, the realists claimed, evaluation should not stop at establishing ‘what works’. To beof use to planners, it should establish ‘what works, for whom, and in what circumstance’.Tackling the problem of attribution is all well and good, but what about the problem of
generalisation? Thus, the school of realist evaluation was born.
Positivists vs. realists: A clash of scientific philosophies with
implications for the ‘real world’The (often lively!) debate between proponents of EBE and defenders of realist evaluationreflects an old schism in the philosophy of science, which opposes positivists and realists.Rhapsodising about matters of philosophy is far beyond the scope of this report, and likely oflimited interest to its intended audience, but it is worth mentioning this disagreement, which isat the root of clashing visions in many domains of human action.Facing-off are the positivists, who deem that scientific knowledge amounts to observables(data), and realists, who hold that scientific knowledge is made up not only of observations (ofwhich experimental results and MoEs are examples), but also of unobservables, such as theories,hypotheses and causal mechanisms.Realists require not only observations, but also explanations.
This schism is more than mere academic dispute and manifests concretely in ways thatimpact social interventions.For example, in CP the so-called ‘risk factor’ approach is positivist by nature. It involvesthe statistical analysis of population characteristics in order to identify factors associated withcriminality. These factors are, in turn, used as a measure of an individual’s ‘risk’ of futureinvolvement in crime. Checklists of ‘risk factors’ (e.g. for delinquency; for radicalisation) arepopular among decision-makers: design a scorecard and one can quantitatively assignindividuals to one category of interest or another.But this is not without downsides. Since statistics are about correlation, not causation, thefactors uncovered through this approach could be any number of things: a predictor, a symptom,a statistical accident, or, if one is very lucky, a cause. A ‘risk factor’-based framework doesn’texplain how or why a given factor (e.g. personality trait; education level; attribute such asgender or age) is associated with criminality (or any other outcome); it can only say that it is.
6 Note that this critique of RCT isn’t exclusive to CP. It is also present in the domain of community-basedpreventive medicine, which involves large-scale programmes aimed at whole populations. See, forexample, Rootman et al (2001).
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This can present a serious problem. Because they are essentially atheoretical (i.e. story-free), factor-based models cannot offer an explanation when a factor associated with risk in onecontext turns out to be associated with resilience in another, which is not uncommon7. Hence, ontheir own, they are poor guides for action.
More importantly, this kind of purely statistical approach finds it difficult to discriminatebetween those variables that ‘matter’ (causal factors) and those that don’t (markers, symptoms,irrelevant statistical associations) for the purpose of prevention. This is a significant issue in afield like CP, where hundreds of factors which correlate with crime have been identified. Who isto be targeted? What interventions should be prioritised? Statistics cannot say.Yet, to prevent a problem from occurring one must disrupt its causes, not just attack thesymptoms associated with it. Breaking a barometer does absolutely nothing to disrupt theweather. In the search for an actionable knowledge-base, one needs more than a laundry list ofstatistical correlations, however rigorously produced8.One needs causal explanation – a narrative which sets out how and why one thing bringsabout another.
The argument for ‘good stories’Testament to the importance of this causal narrative is that a good story is one of the hallmarksof mature science. New theories are rarely accepted by the scientific community until a plausiblecausal process has been conjectured, which makes sense of observations.As John Eck (2005:708) illustrates:
[E]arly proponents of continental drift were unable to persuade geologists that their theory
of continental movement was valid, despite the considerable evidence they amassed. It was not
until 1965 with the elaboration of the underlying mechanism [heating of the earth’s mantle creates
convection currents] (and evidence for that mechanism) that geology accepted the idea that the
earth’s crust moves […].
Bringing the discussion back to the matter of building confidence in OIAs, this indicatesthat an effective OIA evaluation framework should be one which produces explanations, as wellas robust MoEs – one which addresses the challenge of generalisation, as well as attribution.The realist approach to evaluation is discussed at length in the next section, withparticular emphasis on the strategies employed to tackle the problem of generalisation.
7 For example, the same factor, ‘community cohesion’, is associated with a heightened risk of involvementin political violence in the context of nationalist terrorism, but with a lessened risk in the context of home-grown terrorism.
8 For further discussion of this point, see Wikström (2007, 2011).
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SECTION 5
Realist evaluation: Wrestling with
the problem of generalisation
Devil’s Advocate par excellenceRealist evaluation (RE) is theory-driven. This statement has profound implications, not only forthe design and conduct of evaluation activity, but for the design and conduct of the social activity(CP initiative, health improvement programme, IO) being evaluated.From the realist perspective, the commissioners, designers and implementers of socialchange activities are engaged in a scientific endeavour, even if they are often unaware of it. Whatis an IO, the realists argue, if not the implementation of an idea (in other words, a theory) aboutthe kind of activities (treatment) which can be introduced into a particular social environment(study population) to effect a change (treatment outcome)?Evaluation, then, is the process of validating (or invalidating) the treatment assumptionsimplicit in an operation. As Pawson and Tilley (2004:2), the fathers of RE, put it:
"When one evaluates realistically, one always returns to the core theories about how a
programme is supposed to work and then interrogates it – is that basic plan sound, plausible,
durable, practical, and above all, valid?"
The realist evaluator is a Devil’s Advocate par excellence, whose unrelenting advocacy isput to a specific purpose: to improve future operations. If the realist evaluator doesn’t stop atestablishing effectiveness (or measuring success), it’s because she knows that evaluation servesa greater purpose: it provides the lessons – the knowledge-base – upon which future operationswill be founded. Hers is a drive for constant improvement.This requires more than cataloguing and measuring the operation’s outcomes. It requires
making sense of them.
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Deconstructing operationsFor the realist, operations are “theories incarnate” (Pawson & Tilley 2004:3). The theoriesbehind an operation are often complex. Paradoxically, the more complex they are, the less likelyit is that the designers of the operation have articulated them fully, or at all.The first task of the realist evaluator is to uncover these assumptions (or ‘black boxes’), ascomprehensively as can be managed. This is usually achieved through analysis of the operation’sdocumentation, as well as interviews with the operation’s designers and implementers beforethe activity starts, and through careful collection of (qualitative and/or quantitative)observations once the activity is underway.Uncovering all of the assumptions implicit in an operation can be quite an undertaking. Itis not unheard of for a programme of activity to be rolled out without much thought being givenbeforehand as to the reasons ‘why’.
Eliciting theoriesBox 2 overleaf briefly sketches a prototypical IO, which relies on social media to propagatemessages with the aim of changing the behaviour of a specific group of individuals. It thenpresents a list of the many assumptions which underpin such an IO. The list, though long, isincomplete. Many more assumptions could have been elicited.Some of these assumptions may turn out to have been warranted, but not others. If onewants to learn from this particular operation in a way that will benefit as wide a scope of futureIOs as possible, it is necessary to establish which of these assumptions were supported in theend, and which weren’t.In Box 2’s imagined social media-enabled IO, the assumption that communicating withgroup members via social media platform can change the group’s behaviour might turn out tohave been valid. However, the assumption that the behavioural change would last might nothave been verified (i.e. they resumed the undesirable behaviour in month 7, soon after theoperation ended). Such a finding might suggest the following lesson: that social media cannotachieve lasting behavioural change unless it is sustained (for more than 6 months).Cue the next social media-enabled IO, built along a similar design, which goes on for a year.Once again behavioural change fails to take. The lesson of that evaluation, which builds upon theprevious, is that social media influence is unlikely to achieve lasting change. One possibleexplanation for this is that this sort of activity affects the situational (read: temporary) factorswhich impact behaviour (such as motivation or perception of the capability to carry out anaction), instead of affecting dispositional (read: lasting) factors (such as propensity; i.e. theindividual’s moral filter). This new ‘theory’ will inform the design of the next IO. And so on. Inthis manner, each new evaluation strengthens the OIA knowledge-base.At the end of the day, the evaluator wants to identify the operation’s key ingredients: thoseelements which are responsible for the IO’s success (or its failure). Some of the assumptionswhich drive the IO will be more important than others. These core theories will be the focus ofthe realist evaluation. Time and resources are finite; therefore, less fundamental assumptionswill be weeded out.
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If repeated evaluations fail to validate the assumption that attitude change leads tobehaviour change – a core assumption behind much influence practice – it might be time torevise the theoretical underpinnings of IAs. One would then look for inspiration to models ofbehavioural change that don’t rely on attitude change as an active ingredient.
Box 2 Uncovering an operation’s ‘black boxes’
Picture this: an online influence operation, which involves setting up an identity on a social media
platform for the purpose of promoting the adoption of a particular viewpoint or attitude among
the members of a specific group, in order to get the group in question to desist from a particular
course of action. The operation is carried out over six months.Such an operation is bursting at the seams with theories, large and small. To uncover them, askyourself:
“What are the assumptions (the conjectures or sometimes simple guesses) that have gone
into the crafting of this operation?”
The designer appears to have assumed the following:1. that attitude determines behaviour;2. that changing a person’s attitude is enough to change their behaviour;3. that people’s attitudes can be changed by an external influence;4. that changing people’s attitudes can be achieved through online interaction;5. that a social media platform is an effective way to communicate in such a way as to effectattitude change;6. that setting up a new identity on a social media platform is the best way to achieve thedesired objective;7. that setting up a new identity on a media platform is the best use of available resources inthe quest to achieve the desired objective;8. that a credible media identity can be set up in six months;9. that six months is enough time to influence a group in a lasting way;10. that the particular attitude or viewpoint being targeted for change is the cause of thegroup’s undesirable behaviour in the first place;11. that offline sources of influence will not counter the effectiveness of the online message;12. that the group will not revert to its prior behaviour as soon as the operation ceases;13. that any change in attitude will not result in unintended negative consequences, eitheramong the target group or some unknown party (for example: the creation of the newidentity spurs others on the same media platform to begin their own campaign of counter-influence);14. that the social media platform will continue to operate for the next six months;
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15. that the group members are rational agents, who behave in predictable ways;16. that the group members will be culturally sensitive to the framing of the messagepropagated through the social media platform;17. that the group members have regular internet access;18. that they are susceptible to influence...
Think of all the ducks that need to be put in a row (all the core assumptions that need to bevalid) for the stated objective to be achieved.The list is not exhaustive. What appeared like a straightforward ‘idea’ at the outset turns out notto be so simple after all. Many of these assumptions will turn out to be ungrounded guesses.Some may never have been articulated by the operation designers.
Each is a ‘black box’, which the evaluator must open.
The earlier in the life of the operation, the better.
The quest for mechanismsIf theories are the broad narratives about the causes of change that drive an IO, mechanisms arethe processes through which that change actually occurs.As stated previously, in much of science causation is not generally assumed until a crediblemechanism has been postulated (as in the example of continental drift)9. The postulation of aplausible mechanism is often what will prompt scientists to go from talking about an‘association’ or correlation between two factors, to hypothesizing that one is the cause of theother. Interest in this mechanism-based view of causation has been gaining in many areas ofsocial science, inspired by the state of affairs in the natural sciences.Since evaluation is, in essence, an exercise in trying to assess the support for a causalrelationship between the operation and its outcome, uncovering and testing for the presence ofmechanisms is a foremost task for the realist evaluator.
On this point, two important remarks:
1. Mechanisms are generally unobservable. Gravity cannot be seen, only its effect. Mechanismsare inferred from data or deduced through logic from theory. The mechanism is not thesame as the ‘measure’ being put in place. A variety of measures can activate the samemechanism, and one measure can activate more than one mechanism.
9 For a full discussion of the role of mechanisms in science generally, see Bunge (2004).
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2. Social causation, and the subsequent activating of social causal processes (socialmechanisms), is almost inevitably the result of causal interaction. For example, a crime isthe result of a perception-choice process (mechanism) which results from the interaction ofan individual with a particular propensity for action and a situation with particularcriminogenic features10. Single-cause explanations of social events are rare, if any exist atall.
Conjecturing a mechanism involves making an educated guess about the link between the
operation’s key ingredients and its outcomes. Without positing these mechanisms, the evaluatorcannot generalise and draw lessons for future operations.Examples of measures and mechanisms implicated in CP include:
 increasing the perceived effort of stealing a car (the mechanism) by giving away freesteering locks with every car purchase (the measure);
 influencing perceptions of risk (the mechanism) by publicising that a policing operationaimed at cracking down on residential burglaries is under way, in the local paper and onthe news (the measure);
 removing a perceived provocation that could provide motivation for disruptive behaviour(the mechanism) by offering halal meals for Muslim offenders in prison (the measure).
Operations and programmes generally involve several mechanisms, which may need towork in tandem to produce the desired outcome.A rule of thumb: if the operation designers cannot, at the outset, explain how an operation
will achieve its objective – i.e. through which (plausible) mechanisms – it is unlikely to be successful.This basic challenge to any planned operation (‘Show me your mechanism’) may end upsparing an organisation a lot of wasted time and effort.
Research designs and the anticipation of unintended effectsEliciting key theories and positing mechanisms serves yet another purpose: it guides theevaluator in the elaboration of the research design and the all-important task of data collection.One of the particularities of realist evaluations is that realist science is, as Robert Sampsonputs it, “catholic on method”. It is not assumed that one type of research design (such as therandomised control trial) trumps all others when it comes to evaluating social change initiativesin natural settings. There is no ‘gold standard’. Instead, there are appropriate methods to answer
specific questions.Some questions may necessitate qualitative approaches, other quantitative designs. Beforedeciding which method to choose (e.g. focus group; in-depth interviews; time series analysis)
10 For a fuller discussion of the problem of causation, see Wikström (2011).
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and what data to collect, one must know what questions are being asked. This is where theelicitation of theories comes in.Eliciting theories from the operation’s designers and commissioners – making explicitwhat is often implicit – is also the first step towards anticipating unintended consequences ofthe operations. Action can provoke unintended reaction.Dixit sociologist Robert K. Merton (1936):
“[W]ith the complex interaction that constitute society, action ramifies. Its consequences are
not restricted to the specific area in which they are intended to center and occur in interrelated
fields ignored at the time of action.”
Preventing burglary in one neighbourhood may, if certain contextual features are present,displace the problem to another. Anticipation means that the evaluator can select a researchdesign and identify a class of data which will allow for the monitoring and detection of theunintended effect (here, taking measures of the problem in adjacent neighbourhoods).Because it is impossible to implement all-encompassing research designs and to collectperfect data, anticipation is key.
The importance of ‘context’As previously stated, the realist approach is particularly sensitive to the role of context. This isthe crux of the contention regarding the use of randomised control trials (RCTs) as an evaluationmethodology.The main purpose of RCTs is to rule out all sources of influence aside from the ‘treatment.’For example, in a drug trial, the RCT would control for (rule out the impact of) such ‘ingredients’as patients forgetting to take their medicine and others neglecting to fill in their prescriptionsbecause they didn’t have time to run to the pharmacy during business hours.By contrast, the realist will look to detect and understand the role of these context-specificingredients. Once the treatment is rolled out ‘in real life with real people’, the realist argues,these ingredients will play a part, so they have to be accounted for. A well-controlled drugexperiment will tell you much about the efficacy of the treatment once introduced into a human
biological system. It won’t tell you much about its effectiveness once introduced into a human
social system. Hence, evaluations must take into account the effect of the system into whichintervention takes place, or fail to achieve critical understandings.If one wants to understand how an IO will perform under ‘real conditions’, context-specificingredients must be treated as part-and-parcel of the process of change, not ruled out ofevaluations because they might ‘pollute’ the findings. Contextual ingredients – more specifically,the way they interact with the operation’s own ingredients to produce outcomes – are thefindings.One of the most challenging tasks for the realist evaluator is, therefore, to understand
enough about the interaction between the characteristics of the operation (its measures and
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mechanisms) and the characteristics of the context in which it is implemented, to draw lessons
about the conditions under which a future operation is likely to succeed – or likely to fail.Mechanisms tend to be highly context-sensitive. Interaction with inauspicious contextualfeatures may prevent a mechanism from being activated and achieving the expected outcome.(More on that in the next section.)
Operating in ‘open systems’The study of the interaction effects between the features of social interventions and the featuresof contexts is complicated by the fact that initiatives are implemented in open systems.Characteristically, open systems are subject to multiple sources of influence. Severalinterventions may be taking place at once, either administered by the same organisation, or byrival outfits. Influence can be exerted by informal agents, such as the media, politicians, civilorganisations, business, networks of acquaintances, friends and family.Open systems are subject to the knock-on effects of changes taking place in other systems,such as large scale political and economic changes. These changes reverberate across levels ofanalysis (i.e. from macro to micro and back). Think of the impact of monetary policies adoptedin Brussels, which, through the complex, often poorly understood knock-on interactions ofeconomic systems, affect the decisions and behaviour of families in another part of the world.Think, similarly, of the impact kinetic operations may have on IOs. In a RAND report on theeffectiveness of PsyOps in Afghanistan, the author observes that IOs ran afoul of perceptionsshaped by kinetic operations taking place concurrently – such as house searching, or, in extremecases, airstrikes which caused civilian casualties.No IO takes place in a vacuum. Case in point: Events which take place offline can havetremendous impact on events which take place online, and vice versa. Indeed, if events in onesystem could not affect events in another, there would be no point undertaking OIAs in the firstplace.
System permeability can be an advantage when harnessed and a drawback if ignored.
Evaluation activity must establish what role system permeability played in the operation’s
outcome.
Understanding operation-context interactionsGuided by theory, it is the job of the realist evaluator to identify the external factors whichimpact operational outcome. Some may turn out to be key ingredients in success or failure.Others may turn out to be the real cause of the change being observed, meaning success orfailure would have been wrongly attributed to the operation had this factor not been considered.Picture the impact of the release of a new iPhone on snatch-and-grab figures in London. Apolice operation intended to reduce this type of crime, which coincided with the iPhone release,might appear to perform less effectively – having to deal with a sudden rise in opportunities for
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theft and an increase in offender motivation – than the same operation implemented at anothertime. The evaluator must root out such changes in the operation’s environment, in order tocontrol for their impact in her research design. Perhaps, when the sudden influx of newattractive smartphones on the streets is ruled out, the police operation is shown to be relativelysuccessful after all. If it hadn’t been implemented, the numbers would have been worse. Therealist evaluator doesn’t want to throw the baby out with the bathwater without good reason.
Equally, the realist evaluator wants to keep track of the way an operation might affect theconditions of its own future success. Intervention is change, and change can create risks andvulnerabilities where there were none. For example, publicising the successes of medicalresearch in developing treatments for HIV, to the extent that the people infected can expect tolive a near-normal life, might affect public perceptions of risk, leading to a decline in condomusage and an increase in cases of HIV.In the case of Box 2’s hypothetical operation, setting up a new social media identity mightprompt others to create identities of their own in order to counter the perceived influence. Thisis an example of the well-known problem – in CP and other domains – of escalation. Keepingtrack of unintended system change is an important task of evaluations.Realists are, by definition, pragmatists: they accept that some element of self-defeating
change, or a decrease in effectiveness over time, is inevitable. That is why operations must beevaluated routinely for improvement.
Theory failure vs. implementation failureOn the subject of throwing babies out with the bathwater, realist evaluators recognise that thefactors involved in the implementation of an operation – its delivery – play a crucial role in thefinal outcome of the activity.Much as the evaluator wants to attribute correctly which effects are due to operationalactivity and which are due to contextual variations (as in the iPhone example), they also want tocorrectly attribute those effects which are due to implementation factors. Remember: the chiefaim of the evaluation is to learn the right lessons from the operation, not just to measureeffectiveness.Consider once again the example in Box 2. Some of the assumptions elicited are clearlyrelated to a particular theory of influence (e.g. ‘it is possible to influence people’s attitudesthrough online media’; ‘six months is enough time to achieve this’), while others are related toimplementation (e.g. ‘the social media platform will continue to operate for the next six months’;‘the targeted group has regular internet access’).If all implementation assumptions are met (stable media platform, messages rolled out onschedule and according to plan, group access to the internet is confirmed), but the operationdoesn’t deliver, we may be dealing with a case of partial or total theory failure. We mightconclude that some or all of the designers’ theoretical assumptions – about the capacity of online
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media to influence attitude, about the role of attitude in determining behaviour, and so on –were wrong.If, however, it can be established that the operation was not delivered according to plan,then we may instead be dealing with a case of implementation failure.
Examples of implementation failure include:
 planning an operation which requires that ‘treatment’ be delivered by trainedpersonnel, but finding out ‘on the day’ that such personnel are unavailable;
 counting on the cooperation of partners (e.g. civil organisations, foreignagencies), who, once the operation is under way, refuse to ‘play ball’;
 diffusing messages in a language the local population doesn’t understand.
Implementation failure can occur at all levels of an organisation.The aforementioned RAND report on PsyOps in Afghanistan catalogues a number ofimplementation issues at programme level, such as the long time between planning andexecution due to delays in the approval process which requires going up the chain of commandto battalion levels. As one can imagine, such delays could render communication measuresuseless in cases where response-time is critical.An evaluation must clearly identify which outcomes result from the failure (or success) of
theory, and which result from the failure (of success) or implementation.It would not do to throw out good theory when it has never, in fact, been properly applied.Furthermore, lessons can be learned about factors which support effective implementation, andthe need for implementation failure contingencies in future operations.
Evaluation comes in different flavoursThere are several types of evaluations, which serve different purposes and are more or lessrelevant to the present remit of building confidence in OIAs.In some cases, agencies want to carry out impact evaluations for punctual measures,knowing that the operation will not be repeated. The intent is only to show that, in thisparticular case, money has been well-spent or something has been achieved; it isn’t to ‘learnlessons’ to be applied elsewhere.
Theory-of-Change evaluations are theory-driven, but rather than test the operation’sunderlying causal theories, they set out to test programme theories. Programme theories aretheories about what is required to carry out a successful programme implementation (e.g. whatkinds of resourced are needed; what kind of organisational structure and management styleworks best), as opposed to theories about mechanisms (e.g. theories of behaviour or theories ofinfluence).
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Theory-of-Change evaluations are most often used to evaluate complex programmes,which coordinate multiple initiatives or require rolling-out on a large scale11.Two other types of realist evaluations are of greater interest for OIAs: formative and
summative evaluations.
Formative evaluationsFormative evaluations offer unique benefits in the early days of a new activity, which is why theyshould be prioritised in the first instance with OIAs.They are also the most intrusive form of evaluation, to the extent that they require a highlevel of collaboration between evaluators, designers and implementers – before, during andafter the operation is underway.Formative evaluations are a species of action research, which involves the closecollaboration of academics and practitioners within projects aiming to improve interventions inorder to solve concrete social problems.In the early stages of a formative evaluation, experts who have extensive knowledge ofscientific theories and the scientific evidence-base in the relevant domain (here: theories ofinfluence and behavioural research), work closely with operation designers to:
1. Analyse the problem and establish what is the objective of the operation(what change is being pursued);
2. Given 1), establish what is the theoretical basis for the operation (whatrelevant theories are out there; what are their respective evidence-base);
3. Ascertain what techniques are available to achieve the desired change inlight of the theory or theories selected in 2);
4. Determine the delivery methods which will best enable theimplementation of the techniques identified in 3);
5. Track the implementation of the operation and measure expectedeffects;
6. Make sense of (typically mixed) results and synthesise lessons learned.
The advantage of formative evaluations for operation designers is that designers can avail
themselves of expertise that (if the evaluator is well-selected) reflects the state-of-the-art in the
science of human and social change, without having to conduct onerous and often complexliterature searches themselves.For the academics, the benefit is obvious: they are granted a rare opportunity to testtheoretical assumptions in real-life conditions.
11 For a comparison between theory of change and realist evaluation, see Blamey and Mackenzie (2007).
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Because these phases have an iterative character, the evaluators are on hand to helpdesigners and implementers fine-tune the operation as it goes, rather than wait until after thefacts to declare that something has failed. They are also most likely to detect counter-intuitiveeffects or unintended consequences of the activity, including unexpected improvements or side-benefits, allowing implementers to capitalise on these.Formative evaluations require trust and the willingness to collaborate betweenindividuals with different priorities and different stakes in the operation. For this reason, theycan face practical obstacles (e.g. access to sensitive data: few academics have security clearance).However, the rewards in terms of confidence-building are non-negligible. Evaluators canhelp designers formulate explicit predictions and convincing narratives of effectiveness (e.g.‘this technique achieved this [visible] change among this group of this population because itactivated this [invisible] mechanism in this particular context’).
Nothing builds confidence like an accurate prediction backed up by a plausible story of
success.
Summative evaluationsThe main difference between a formative evaluation, and a summative one, is that formativeevaluators guide the formulation of theories and techniques underpinning the operation, ratherthan simply elicit them. In terms of Phase 5 and 6, however, the logic is the same.In the realist tradition, summative evaluations have two components: process evaluationand outcome evaluation. This two-pronged approach owes to the need to correctly attributeresponsibility for outcomes.The process evaluation tracks the delivery of the operation: what was done, when, withwhat resources – on the ground, rather than on paper. It is through process evaluation that wecan find out, for example, that 100 anti-burglary alarms were purchased, but only 50 weredistributed to residents of the neighbourhood, 20 were installed, and only 10 were properlyplugged-in and functional. A good process evaluation will even be able to tell you why only 10%of alarms on which money was spent were put to use in the end.The outcome evaluation, meanwhile, monitors the intended and unintended consequencesof the operation, in order to assess its effectiveness and the reasons behind it. Both evaluationscan be conducted retrospectively, but the best process and outcome evaluations are plannedfrom the start, concurrently with operation design or very soon after.This owes to the need to collect antecedent data; i.e. establish what the state of things was
before the operation was delivered in order to demonstrate that something changed after; and toestablish in advance of time what kind of information must be collected as the operation goes onto properly test the elicited assumptions.If run concurrently to the operation, process evaluation may even help addressimplementation failure as or before it occurs. In practice, process and outcome are almost neverassessed separately, which is not a problem. As long as the evaluation includes measures ofoutputs (implementation targets; e.g. number of leaflets distributed) as well as outcomes
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(ultimate targets; e.g. change in voting intentions), process patterns can be monitored andoutcome patterns interpreted in light of that information.Regardless of what it is called, the evaluation must deliver enough information to makesense of what happened. For IOs, the main lesson is this: when carrying out evaluations,
measures of effectiveness (MoEs) can never be enough. MoEs provide the undeniably necessarypicture of ‘what worked where’, but not ‘why it worked there’.MoEs do not an evaluation make. Attention to theory and mechanisms is needed to construct
a convincing and useful narrative of success.
Improving upon realist evaluationWhile it most certainly doesn’t deny that attributing causation is one of the chief goals ofevaluation, the realist approach unashamedly puts a premium on tackling the problem ofgeneralisation, advocating that particular attention be paid to mechanism-context interactions.Given this emphasis on contextual effects, one would expect realist evaluators to have dedicateda great deal of attention to what is, in this report, referred to as the problem of analysis.Put another way: one would expect that the realist tradition would have produced, if notactual tools, then a framework within which to analyse the features of open social systems, tohelp problem analysts and solution designers identify which aspects of the operation’s contextmay interact with the operation’s activities to affect the outcome.However, at this juncture, context analysis seems to remain an act of imagination whichrests almost entirely on the individual skills and expertise of individual evaluators. Yet, in theabsence of a systematic approach, realist evaluation runs the risk of coming under fire, as it hasin CP, for its lack of procedural clarity.If evaluation is to become the standard in IAs, the problem of analysis must be addressedmore rigorously. It will also be necessary to evaluate, or at least expand upon, the realist claimthat operations are (and should inspire to be) chiefly ‘incarnations of (scientific) theories’. As thecase will be made later on in this report, operations are based on much more than theories aboutcauses of change (e.g. mechanisms of influence). They also reflect rules of implementation anddesign, which come under the heading of engineering more than science.
As we will see, making the distinction between what belongs to the domain of science andwhat belongs to engineering and technology has more than academic consequences for thefuture of evaluation activities, as well as for the future of IAs. Reformulating the product ofrealist evaluations as technological rules instead of fuzzier notions would begin to address achief criticism of realist evaluation – that it is more ‘craft’ than ‘science’ – while preserving itsmost valuable contribution: the grounds for generalisation provided by mechanism-basedexplanations, which highlight the imperative to go beyond mere MoEs.But more on that later. In the next section, it is proposed that updating the realist logicwith an analytical framework purposefully formulated to handle social systems is a promisingway of attacking the neglected problem of analysis.
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SECTION 6
Going ‘systemist’: Dealing with the
problem of analysis
From ‘context’ to ‘system’To help decision-makers and operation designers figure out what activities might work toachieve their particular objective, the realist evaluator needs to establish what kind of measuresactivate which mechanisms in what sort of context to produce which outcome.This process consists in identifying context-mechanism-outcome (C-M-O) configurations,which are the key transferrable product of a realist evaluation.Isolating C-M-O configurations is easier said than done. Although ‘mechanism’ is a conceptwith a fairly long philosophical pedigree, ‘context’, like ‘environment’, is a much looser notion,and while identifying relevant contextual features in a small, well-contained initiative seemsdoable (e.g. hiring attendants to prevent thefts in a car park; see Table 1 overleaf), doing thesame in light of a much more ambitious operation (e.g. conducting an online campaign toimprove the perception of Coalition forces among national populations, in order to gain supportfor troupes in Afghanistan) is another kind of challenge entirely.To date, the notion of ‘context’ remains imprecisely defined in the realist approach. Whilerealists make great case of interventions taking place in ‘open systems’, they have not clearlydefined what a ‘system’ is, nor how it should be handled concretely. Neither have theyelaborated on the relationship between ‘system’ and ‘context’ – often seeming to use thesenotions interchangeably.
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As a consequence, there is currently no realist methodology or analytical framework foridentifying relevant aspects of context – those all-important features of the environment whichare likely to interact with the operation’s activity to produce intended and unintended outcomes.Yet an evaluation framework destined for OIAs must be able to anticipate and harnessissues of permeability, knock-on effects, and interaction effects – and do so reliably. If one is tocapitalise on the strengths of the realist approach, notably the delivery of convincing andgeneralisable narratives, this analytical shortcoming must be addressed.
Table 1 Mechanism-Context Configurations for Car Park Theft
Measure How it works
(mechanism)
Works best if… (context)
Improving
surveillance at
deck and lot
entrances/exits
by improving
lighting, removing
obstructions
and/or
encouraging
vendors to set up
shop there
Increases thieves’perception of the risk ofdetection when entering andleaving the car park
…the facility’s perimeter issecure (i.e. thieves can’t get inany other way)
Hiring parking
attendants
Improves surveillance offacilities, especially atentrances and exists …the facility’s perimeter issecure, so those who enter andexit must pass the attendant,and the attendant booth isdesigned to facilitatesurveillance…the priority is reducing theftof cars, as this measure doesn’tperform as well against theftfrom cars
Source: Adapted from Clarke (2002)
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Thinking about systems systematically: The CESM model
Systemism, a philosophical system developed by physicist and philosopher Mario Bunge, offerssome direction. Systemism is not in itself a theory, but an approach to research programmedesign, problem analysis, and, ultimately, solution design. Given that systemism belongs to thescientific realist tradition, realist evaluation’s imprecise notion of ‘context’ can be easilysubsumed under systemism’s better-defined concept of ‘system’, without renouncing othervaluable realist insights.In systemism, a system is defined as “a complex object whose parts or components are held
together by bonds of some kind” (Bunge 2004:188). Examples of systems are atoms and radarnetworks (physical systems), cells and horses (biological systems), business firms, terroristgroups, political parties, crime gangs, families, tribes, armies, and societies (social systems).
A system can be analysed in terms of the CESM model:
 Composition (C); the set of components that are part of the system
 Environment (E); the collection of items (including other systems) that act orare acted upon by the system
 Structure (S); the ensemble of relations (bonds or other links) that hold thesystem’s components together (the endostructure), as well as tie the system’scomponents to items in the environmental (the exostructure)
 Mechanisms (M); the processes that are characteristics of the operations of thesystem, some of which maintain the state of the system, others which effectchange.
The CESM model of a system is a representation of that system at any given time, as eachof these elements are subject to change.The systemic approach differs from other forms of systems theory in that it doesn’tassume that relations between the system’s components is of a single, or main, kind (e.g.economic, political, cultural, biological, and so on). Rather, it considers that all sorts of relational
processes take place at once, and that none necessarily supersede the others.Nor does it assume that either structure (e.g. social bonds), environment (e.g. politicalinstitutions), components (e.g. actors) or mechanisms (e.g. psychological or biologicalmechanisms) are key to the explanation of social processes (including processes of influence), asdo structuralist or rational choice approaches.Instead, systemism considers that each element has its part to play, and to neglect any of
them is to operate based on incomplete information.
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Systemic interaction effects: Dealing with the ‘embeddedness’ of
individuals in multiple social systemsBunge (2004) uses the example of the nuclear family as unit of analysis to illustrate the CESMmodel. This example is expanded upon here to illuminate this analytical approach:
 The components of the family-system are the parents and their children. (Insome cultures, it might include grand-parents, and sometimes more distantkin; as always, context rules.) This example shows well why the model of thesystem must be understood as a snapshot and cannot be held as static: Thinkof the impact an added component (e.g. a new baby) has on the behaviour ofthe family-system.
 The system’s environment is made up of other systems and their components,which act upon, or are acted upon by, the family: the neighbourhood, thevillage, the tribe, the firms in which the parents work, the schools the childrenattend, the civil societies (political parties, cultural clubs, sports associations,online social networks, and so on) to which any of them belong, the army inwhich one of them happens to serve, the local government, and the moredistant, national governmental apparatus.Given any sphere of activity (physical, biological, psychological, social,cultural, political, economic; each sphere a meta-system), the relative influenceof these environmental items on the components of the targeted system willbe ranked differently.
 The structure of the family-system is made up of the bonds that hold itsmembers together; here, biological and psychological bonds, such as love, filialattachment or duty. It also includes external bonds, which link the system’scomponents to the outside, such as bonds of kinship, friendship or trade.
 Finally, the mechanisms of the family are those associated with its essentialfunctions. In most cultures, these would be mechanisms such as caring,nurturing, teaching and learning (the mechanisms which underpin the child-rearing process), as well as the sort of marital exchanges that typify relationsbetween the spouses. When these mechanisms are disrupted or undermined,the system breaks down.
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Systemic problems have systemic solutionsThe systemist approach champions the view that systemic problems must be addressed
systemically: one must pay attention to all the elements of the system, rather than intervene at asingle level. The same rule applies if one wishes to implement any sort of system-wide change.A common example of a failure to think systemically might be: providing humanitarian aidto address the needs of a population (a biological and psychological problem), but failing toaddress endemic corruption at the same time (an economic and political problem), so that mostof the aid effort fails to reach its intended targets.In particular, systemism cautions against the idea that one can effect change in thecomponents of a system (e.g. individuals) without taking into account the system(s) into whichthey are embedded.Consider the vast problem of preventing or reducing delinquency in adolescents. Becauseof the nature of the process of socialisation, which requires attachment (a bond) betweensocialiser and socialisee to operate, an intervention aimed at diminishing the delinquentpropensity of adolescents (e.g. social skills and empathy-raising programmes delivered atschool) must take into account the features of the social systems in which adolescents areembedded (see Box 3).The intervention is doomed to failure if the targeted adolescents are strongly attached(structure) to peers and/or to parents who themselves have delinquent or criminal propensities(composition) and have the opportunity to pass on their crime-supporting views (i.e. ‘teach’;
mechanism) to the adolescents when they leave school (which is only one source of influence intheir environment).To stand a chance of success, the intervention must not only deliver the skills training, butcarry out activities meant to increase the level of attachment kids feel towards their school, aswell as address the antisocial tendencies of their unschooled peers and family members.
Let’s carry this lesson over to the influence domain: Since all influence activities take placein social systems, it is necessary to identify which system the operation is to take place in(operational system), and which system (or component of system) is to be influenced (target
system). Because of the permeability feature discussed earlier, operational and target systemsmay or may not be one and the same.Either way, it will, as illustrated in Box 3, pay greatly to analyse those features of thesystem which are likely to interact with the IA in order to anticipate outcomes.Likewise, if one counts on permeability effects by acting upon the components of onesystem in order to influence the components of another, it will pay to analyse the bonds whichtie these systems together, to pinpoint plausible pathways of influence. If no such pathways canbe identified, the hoped-for knock-on effects may fail to take place, or happen in unpredicted(and possibly destructive) ways.
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Beyond ‘Target Audience Analysis’: From C-M-O to S-M-OSystemic analysis, as advocated here, is several steps of sophistication beyond the kind of TargetAudience Analysis (TAA) techniques employed in the marketing and political communicationdomains.It provides a structured way of thinking about target-environment interactions, and, onestep further, interactions between:
 features of the environment (CESM-related features of target andoperational systems, including, but not limited to, characteristics ofthe population);
Box 3 Why systemic analysis trumps factor-based approach
The systemic nature of social events explains why the ‘risk factor’ approach discussed inSection 4 is an imperfect guide for action. In several cross-sectional studies ofdelinquency, ‘lack of parental attachment’ is found to be a risk factor (a predictor) ofdelinquency. In other studies, however, the opposite outcome is found: ‘lack of parentalattachment’ is a protective factor against delinquency. For many, this is a counter-intuitive finding. Why would feeling little love for your progenitors protect you againstfuture criminality?Looking at the composition of the system in which adolescents are embedded allows usto make sense of the discrepancy: parental attachment is a protective factor when theparents hold pro-social (crime-averse) values; it’s a risk factor when the parents holdanti-social values or, quite often, are themselves criminals. Hence, in cases where one orboth the child’s parents have criminal propensities of their own, a lack of attachment tothe progenitors will in fact protect the child from the criminogenic influence.The transferrable lesson is this: if one is to design an intervention which aims to change
individual propensity for any given action, in a given direction, one should make sure that
attachment to the new source of influence supersedes attachment to any other sources,
which are pulling in the opposite (moral) direction (like families, schools, churches, gangs,
social institutions of all stripes, or even role models in the popular culture).A common-sense example, perhaps, but so are many explanations in hindsight. Thepoint is that looking at individual-level factors alone does not provide an explanation (andtherefore an effective guide for action). Consideration of systemic processes provides aricher – plausible and actionable – picture.
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 active ingredients of operations (mechanisms and the measures thatactivate them), and;
 desired outcome.
The traditional C-M-O configuration of realist evaluation should, for the purpose of guidingoperations in highly permeable systems (such as cyber environments) be upgraded to thefollowing analytical product:
S (relevant aspects of the CESM configuration, including system-to-
system relations)
M (measure-to-mechanism, including cross-level mechanisms)
O (Outcome, intended and unintended)
Once identified, these products will make up the basis of the concrete, sharable andtransferrable products of OIA evaluations. As they accumulate and are translated into plausiblecausal narratives, confidence in OIAs will grow.
The challenge of policy transfer: Tackling the risk of systemic failureIn a paper on the limitations of RCT evaluation designs, criminologist Robert Sampsonelaborates upon the importance of understanding the impact of system embeddedness forpolicy, highlighting that:
“once a policy takes effect the rules of the game change, possibly inducing system level
changes” (Sampson 2010:494).
This, Sampson argues, takes us beyond the problem of generalisation. It is less aboutgeneralisation than it is about transfer from one level of analysis to another, because “homology
of processes [mechanisms] across levels cannot be assumed” (ibid:495). In other words, whatworked for a small group of individuals cannot be assumed to work once applied to a wholepopulation.
Sampson takes as example a measure which involves taking black children who live in asegregated part of the city by bus to white schools with better resources, in order to improvetheir educational outcomes. Evaluations are carried out using RCTs, which provide evidence thatthe measure is effective. An ambitious policy is crafted to roll out the approach nationally andtackle the burning problem of education inequality.Though presented as a thought-exercise, the example is not hypothetical. What happenedin practice was that white families, who seemingly did not want their children schooledalongside ‘too many’ black children, chose to leave the targeted areas for new pastures. The end-
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result was schools that were filled mainly with children from socio-ethnic minorities, inneighbourhoods with a decreased tax-base, and therefore fewer educational resources available.Though the measure did well in experimental conditions, the effect of implementing theinitiative as a policy, system-wide, was segregation. The white families’ reaction to the policy offorced mixity rendered moot the lessons inferred from the evaluations. Once rolled out, themeasure encountered systemic conditions which interacted with the intervention’s ‘ingredients’in wholly new and unpredicted (though not de facto unpredictable) ways.When explanations inferred from evaluations fail to predict the outcome of system-widepolicies, we may talk about systemic failure.
It’s important to note that observational (realist) evaluations would not necessarily haveperformed better in the example of the busing initiative. At issue is the kind of theoretical
framework adopted, implicitly or explicitly, at the outset, which drives the choice of models,methods and analytical techniques to be used in the design of research programmes,interventions, and, eventually, evaluations.Those frameworks must set out to investigate and articulate cross-level mechanisms. Failingthat, they cannot hope to anticipate the effect of operations once they are implemented in opensocial systems – where they will likely have to contend with, among other things, recalcitranttargets who refuse to behave in expected ways.More on the characteristics of theoretical frameworks which can best support a systemicapproach and help evaluators deal with the problem of analysis in Section 7.
Further readingBunge, M. (2004). “How Does It Work? The Search for Explanatory Mechanisms.” Philosophy of
the Social Sciences, 34(2): 182-210. Available from:http://www.gemas.fr/dphan/cosmagems/docs/socio/PhilosophyOfTheSocialSciences2004Symposium_2Bunge.pdfBunge, Mario (2006). Chasing reality: Strife over realism. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.Bunge, M. (2006). “A systemic perspective on crime.” In P-O Wikstrom and R. Sampson, The
explanation of crime: Context, mechanisms and development. Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress.Sampson, R. (2010). “Gold standard myths: Observations on the experimental turn inquantitative criminology.” Journal of quantitative criminology , 25: 489-500.
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SECTION 7
Building a knowledge-base for
operation and evaluation design
Good theories help you understand what the problem is in the first
place (and what it will take to solve it)The point has been made that influence operations can only be as good as the theories that drivethem. It is perhaps less evident that theories, like operations, can and should be evaluated forfitness.To begin with, a good theory speaks directly to the matter at hand. A statement of theobvious, perhaps, but which drives home an important point: the choice of the theoreticalapproach which guides an IO is dictated by the problem analysis and subsequent problem
statement, which motivated the IO in the first place.What may seem straightforward (“In order to achieve our strategic goal G, We wantpopulation P to adopt attitude A so they will be more likely to perform behaviour B”) is in factnot so. This statement is already weighted with theoretical assumptions of the kind an evaluatorshould elicit and assess, such as ‘attitudes can be induced’ and ‘attitudes shape behaviour’.A good knowledge-base will inform the formulation of the problem statement, a processwhich is most evident when conducting a formative evaluation. That first step is crucial, because
a problem wrongly formulated cannot be solved. The experience of CP suggests that crimereduction efforts are often wasted or largely ineffective because the problem is badly-stated, andthus the objective of the intervention is wrongly identified at the start.
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Let us brainstorm our hypothetical operation to achieve goal G:For one thing, behaviour B may just be a symptom of the problem, not its cause, andaltering it will do nothing to achieve goal G. Even if behaviour B is indeed a cause, attitude A maybe wrongly assumed to determine behaviour B. The criminological knowledge-base suggeststhat no reliable, causal [attitude behaviour] mechanism has been found, and that influencingpopulation P’s perception of Situation S by altering some features in their environment is a morereliable mechanism to effect a change in behaviour B.But how long-lasting and pervasive does this change need to be? Changing behaviour canbe achieved in the short-term by altering situational features, assuming that we have a validtheory of situational action. A long-term change, however, requires either a permanent, or atleast sustained, change of the features of Situation S, or a change in population P’s propensity forbehaviour B. For this, we need a valid theory of propensity development.This takes us into the realm of socialisation (effecting lasting changes in people’s minds) asopposed to conditioning (effecting short-to-medium term changes in people’s behaviour).Socialisation requires long-term commitment, better coordination, and access to much greaterresources than is needed to achieve a short-term change in behaviour B.Let’s refine our example: If goal G is to de-radicalise a population P (i.e. remove theirpropensity to perceive terrorism as a plausible action-alternative, which is a long-term change),then a sustained, developmental approach is required. If goal G is to reduce the number ofterrorist attacks committed by population P with short-term effect (a behavioural change), thena situational approach is appropriate (e.g. inducing perceptions that terrorist attacks are risky,unrewarding, or require higher capability than population P can muster).Short-term and long-term change rely on different mechanisms, and the difference in theamount of investment required to effect this change is equal to the psychological distancebetween compliance on the one side and conversion on the other. One can be achieved withminimum involvement, but is temporary; the other is lasting, but will demand a more committedapproach.
So what, exactly, is it that we should be aiming to achieve, given our overall objective?
Armed with this sort of analytical exercise, supported by the knowledge-base onbehavioural change, it is possible to define goal G explicitly and confirm that it is, indeed, thegoal we want to achieve, establish whether changing attitude A is truly the best way to achieve it,as well as acquire a sense of the effort which will be required to attain goal G. All this before anypart of the operation has been implemented.We may ultimately choose to reconsider going ahead with the operation altogether. In thefinal analysis, that is a question for planners, not operation designers, but now it is informed by aclearer statement and analysis of the problem.A good theory will help you determine whether it is better to do nothing, than to do
something just for the sake of it.
Caveat: the knowledge-base guiding this type of analytical exercise must be commensurate
to the problem-space. If the objective of IOs is to change behaviour, then the knowledge-base
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should rest upon scientific models of behavioural change (as opposed, for example, to models ofattitude change, unless these models clearly articulate the mechanisms linking attitude tobehaviour, rather than merely assuming them).Hence, if the objective is to sway individuals who already hold strong beliefs, as opposedto unformed opinions, knowledge-bases located in commercial, social, political or even publichealth marketing should be approached with caution. There is a difference of magnitude betweenusing soft techniques to ‘influence’ someone towards the purchase of a pair of jeans when theyintended to buy a pair of jeans all along; to ‘nudge’ someone towards choosing energy-savinglight bulbs instead of regular when they have no opinion either way; or to ‘sway’ the undecidedin an election in the absence of any meaningful stakes for the ‘influencee’; versus changing themind or behaviour of an individual already committed to a cause.
Choosing an inappropriate framework may result in a waste of time, or worse. For example,empirical research in fields such as moral and political psychology suggests that improperlyattempting to influence individuals already committed to a particular viewpoint can entrenchthem even more into their beliefs (in common parlance, it can ‘radicalise’ them).
Major General Andrew McKay and colleagues (2012) address precisely this issue in theircritique of RAND’s evaluation of U.S. Information Operations in Afghanistan, when they question
“the folly of attitudinal communication.”
They state:
“RAND has missed THE fundamental failing in not just US IO and MISO/PsyOps but wider
ISAF efforts as well: A naive and immature understanding of the very process of communication in
non-compliant conflict environments and misplaced confidence, and over reliance, upon marketing
and advertising principles.
[We advocate] that marketing and advertising must now be considered as an utterly failed
model for IO and MISO/PsyOps, one which must now be discarded in favour of a behaviorally-led
approach embracing proper, proven, social and behavioural science” (emphasis as original).
A reading of the scientific literature informed by a more appropriate statement of theproblem, they add, demonstrates that the relationship goes change in behaviour change in
attitude, and not the other way around.If that is the case, the implications for IAs and OIAs are profound.
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Good theories are mechanismicIf the main product of evaluations is an understanding of how particular measures activatecertain mechanisms in a given system to achieve a specific outcome, then the theories drivingthe operations must be mechanismic12.Said one way: Theories or models should explicitly refer to the causal mechanisms involved
in producing the outcome, rather than just describe the factors associated with the outcome (inother words, they should do more than list factors that correlate with the outcome, such asfactors of ‘vulnerability’ or ‘resilience’ to influence).Said another way: They should, as much as possible, not contain ‘black boxes’.
Conjecturing mechanisms is the highest level of explanation a theory can achieve. Ofcourse, these mechanisms need to be plausible and compatible with established scientific lawsand observations. The quest for theory-refinement is a quest for ever-deepening explanations,which conjecture always more concrete (i.e. material) mechanisms.To illustrate, in the study of criminality, observations that serious criminals tend tothoughtlessness led to the formulation of impulsivity as a personality trait associated withcriminal behaviour. A general theory, which states that low self-control is the main individualdeterminant of crime (and the underlying factor behind impulsivity), eventually rose toprominence13. Self-control was then recognised as one aspect of what are now referred to asexecutive functions, a group of brain functions which sit in the pre-frontal cortex, the area of thebrain involved in self-regulation and decision-making.Identifying the underlying neurological mechanisms of self-control allowed forexperimental, cross-sectional and longitudinal study, which is right now deepening ourunderstanding of how individual self-control is established and maintained, what role it plays inbehaviour, how it interacts with other (e.g. affective) brain systems, and under which socialcircumstances it fails or, conversely, is shored up.Down the line, the availability of deeper explanations means more control over the problem.In this case, it opens up a slew of possibilities, from increasing self-control through childhoodintervention to designing out environments that lead to its depletion.
Good theories are interdisciplinary, falsifiable, and no simpler than
they need to be: The counter-example of rational choice modelsIn the social sciences, deep explanations tend to be characterised by their interdisciplinarity.They emerge at the intersection of biology, social cognitive neuroscience, psychology, sociology,
12 The term is borrowed from Mario Bunge (2004) to encompass all forms of mechanism-basedexplanations, not just mechanistic (i.e. mechanical) ones.13 For the seminal statement of self-control theory, see Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990).
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social ecology, statistics, and so on, and integrate and make sense of findings across cognateknowledge domains14.One of several objections to the usefulness of rational choice models (RCMs) in socialscience is that they make no reference to deep mechanisms and largely fail to take into accountevidence showing that human behaviour and decision-making is underpinned by dual systems(cognitive and affective), which highlight the role of automaticism, cognitive biases, and otherirrational mechanisms in the production of human judgement, human decision-making, and,ultimately, human behaviour15. Because they do not take this established knowledge intoaccount, RCMs are judged to be unrealistic (therefore, un-realist).Another objection, just as crucial, is that the key ‘process’ conjectured by most RCMs – thatindividuals seek to maximise their subjective utility – is a black box that can never be opened,since subjective utility cannot be measured. This means that demonstrating that a givenbehaviour isn’t the outcome of utility maximisation, and that humans do not, in fact, always seekto maximise their utility, whatever the circumstance, is impossible to show. All of humanbehaviour can be ‘reinterpreted’ as being in the actor’s self-interest from her perspective16. Inother words, the theory can be made to fit any set of events.‘Unopenable’ black boxes make theories unfalsifiable. Indeed, Becker (cited in Bunge1996:374), claims that since “rationality can be pretty flexible and the data are often limited, I
don’t frequently encounter decisive evidence against rationality”, hereby sparing RCMs the risk ofrefutation. This is a cardinal sin in science, and furthermore a serious problem in the context ofan evaluation.If a black box cannot be opened, then an explanation of what happened cannot beproduced. If a theory cannot be falsified (i.e. proven wrong), then why bother conducting an
evaluation at all?
Some theories are attractive to academics and practitioners alike, because of theirparsimony (they are relatively simple, compared to others). But a full statement of Occam’sRazor reminds us that the point is not to choose the simplest theory by default; it is to choosethe simplest between two or more theories which all explain the problem equally well and are
equally-well supported by the evidence.Shorter: In the matter of theory selection, we should go for the optimum level of complexity,
not the maximum level of simplicity.
14 This is why any given problem space should avoid becoming the chasse guardée of a single discipline – aproblem known as ‘disciplinary capture’.
15 For an accessible, engaging and seminal text on this topic, see Economics Nobel prize-winner Daniel
Kahneman’s (2011) Thinking Fast and Slow.
16 For an extended discussion of this problem, see Hodgson (2012).
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Good theories are generalMechanismic theories, so long as they refer to concrete mechanisms, will have the benefit ofgeneral application within the boundaries of their problem domains. Science aspires togenerality: it wants to explain many cases; not one or a few. By contrast, problems are alwayslocal: they are the product of historical circumstances, which may never be repeated.How, then, can we understand the relevance of general science to local problems?Writing about the role of the theoretical knowledge-base in CP, Per-Olof Wikström(2007:72, 75) puts it this way:
“Local [CP] partnerships face very different realities. The problem profiles vary considerably.
[...] However, the fact that the problems are different does not mean that the underlying causes of
particular problems are different. I submit that the causes are the same, while the problems are
not. The reason why partnerships face different problems is simply that the factors causing various
problems differ among localities in their presence and strength. [...]
A well-developed and knowledge-based strategy (founded on an empirically-grounded theory
of crime causation) would make it possible for policy-makers and practitioners to better focus their
attention on the social, developmental and situational processes in which intervention can make
the greatest impact in preventing or reducing crime and disorder.”
Faced with a uniquely local problem, a well-supported, mechanismic theory will helpoperation designers reduce seemingly unique, intractable complexity to a set of essential
observations. It will tell them where to look.This is good news. Without general theories, we would have to start from scratch withevery new problem.
Good theories are systemic (or compatible with a systemic
approach) and expand the scope for actionTo assist planners and designers with the strategic, analytical and practical challenge of carryingout operations in open social systems, theories must be systemic in their outlook.This is not at all to say that the only useful theories or models are those which tacklesystem-wide events. Rather, it is to say that a useful theory is one that plays well with other
established theories and ideas, adding something to our understanding of causal processes at
different levels of analysis (individual, ecological, macro-social, and so on). It is a theory thatenriches the playing field and, for the sake of a maturing scientific knowledge-base, is fertile innew, testable hypotheses and plausible conjectures about causes and causal mechanisms.
Here again, the experience of CP is instructive.
60
Following disenchantment with offender treatment programmes, which not only failed tosignificantly reduce reoffending, but, more importantly, didn’t seem to make a dent in the crimerate, a group of scholars at the UK Policing Research Unit made the case that the crime problemcould not be solved because it was badly stated. The ultimate goal of crime prevention was, inmatter of fact, to prevent crime (an event), not criminality (an individual disposition). Hence,one should worry about crime and stop worrying so much about criminals.Breaking down the factors involved in the emergence of crime events, they posited thecrime triangle: for a crime to happen, a motivated offender and a vulnerable target (person orobject) need to come together at a time and in a place, in the absence of a capable guardian whomight deter the offender and/or protect the target. Hence, the purpose of CP should be toprevent this triangle from forming.Until then, efforts had been aimed mainly at preventing the emergence of a criminaldisposition in individuals. For this approach to be successful, proponents of the crime triangleargued, fundamental research on criminal propensity would have to yield a more robustknowledge-base than was currently available. Furthermore, this kind of intervention wasresource-intensive and long-term; its effectiveness (or ineffectiveness) would not be measurablefor some time. Finally, a focus on ‘criminality’ seemed to imply that only a special class ofindividuals, the ‘criminals’, were responsible for crime, when in fact most people had broken thelaw at one time or another.The perception of rewards and risks (the perception of criminal opportunity) washypothesised as the main causal mechanism of crime events, and the characteristics of placesthemselves, inasmuch as they shaped this perception, were said to play a causal role in theemergence of crime.A whole new level of situational and ecological analysis was unlocked. From there, a‘criminology of place’ was born, drawing from urban design, ecology, economics, management,administration science, architecture and computer modelling, to name a few.
This theoretical reformulation opened up the field of possible interventions in significant ways.Why not, indeed, concentrate efforts on the immediate causes of crime, in order to achieveshort-term reduction in the number of crime events? ‘Hotspot’ policing experienced a meteoricrise as the management and control of places – no longer just people – became the legitimatefocus of policing activity. Marketing technologies, such as public messaging, were put to workalongside more ‘kinetic’ interventions, not as a tool to change offenders’ beliefs or values (a long-term goal), but as a tool to influence their perception of the criminal opportunity in the moment,hereby influencing their decision to proceed, and, ultimately, their actions.
In their original formulation, theories of situational prevention relied on rational choicepostulates to model offender decision-making. More recently, it has been recognised that thisapproach lacks realism, prompting a drive to reformulate perception-choice models, whileholding onto the practical gains accrued by opportunity-based approaches.Today the challenge is to integrate the knowledge-base on offenders and their propensity(developmental models) and the situational processes which give rise to their criminalbehaviour in particular places at particular times (action models).
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The point has been made that a rational and effective crime prevention strategy needsunified, systemic models, which integrate all the causes of crime, from proximal (immediate) todistal (ultimate), in order to guide coherent programmes, as opposed to ‘patchy’ or ‘ad hoc’interventions based on whatever approach happens to be the ‘flavour of the month’.
Ultimately, the choice of the overarching goal of any strategy (short- or long-term;temporary or lasting effects; cheap or costly; preventing the making of crime or the making ofcriminals; investing to tackle both sides) is a policy decision, which the scientific knowledge-base can only do its best to inform.An ambitious policy agenda for IAs needs a robust, well-integrated knowledge-base. In itsabsence, it will be very difficult to produce meaningful problem statements and identifyachievable objectives, or to plan and execute IOs in open social systems with any degree ofcontrol. Without a knowledge-base that is fit-for-purpose, IAs risk being irrelevant andineffective at best, or counterproductive and damaging at worst.
Further readingWikström, P-O. (2007). “Doing Without Knowing: Common Pitfalls in Crime Prevention.” InFarrell, G., Bowers, K., Johnson, S. and M. Townsley (eds.), Imagination for Crime Prevention:
Essays in Honour of Ken Pease. Crime Prevention Studies Vol. 21.
Wikström, P-O. (2011). “Does Everything Matter? Addressing the Problem of Causation and
Explanation in the Study of Crime.” In McGloin. J.M., Sullivan, C. J. and L.W. Kennedy (eds), When
Crime Appears: The Role of Emergence London. Routledge.
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SECTION 8
Evaluation design: Balancing
attribution and generalisation
One evaluation, one designWhen planning an evaluation, the choice ofevaluation design is dictated by thequestions the evaluation sets out toanswer, and guided by the theoreticalframework and problem statement whichunderpin the operation.Good evaluation designs are tailoredto the operations they assess. At the end ofthe day, no single method willsystematically provide the ‘right’ answer,though some will always argue for oragainst their preferred approach.Since this report aims only to providea foundation for the evaluation of OIAs, thissection will merely summarise principles ofevaluation designs in terms of theirrelevance to the challenges identified in theintroduction and expounded throughout:
attribution, generalisation, analysis and
usability.
Previous sections introduced thereader to the logic of evaluation activity.Designs are the concrete tools throughwhich these principles are put intopractice. Some designs are closelyidentified with one evaluation approach
“Data never ‘speak for themselves’ –
making sense of causal patterns requires
theoretical claims about unobserved
mechanisms and social processes no
matter what the experiment or statistical
method employed [...]
The choice of method depends on the
theoretical question and the nature of
the phenomena under study, neither of
which fall on a hierarchy. The hard truth
is that we have little choice but to adapt
in creative ways to the limitations that
confront all social science inquiry.”
Sampson, 2010
(emphasis added)
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(for example, evidence-based evaluations tend to be equated with RCTs); others are employedacross approaches.Like all tools, evaluation designs vary in their degree of sophistication. Some demandsignificant training and experience to operate safely. All of them set out to deal with thechallenges outlined in this report and each of them are, invariably, better at dealing with some ofthese problems than others.
‘What did we do?’ Measuring the impact of activityIf nothing else, an evaluation has to establish what impact the operation had on the field ofactivity. This involves selecting or designing measures or metrics. Most often measures arequantitative (e.g. the number of people who registered on a forum), but they can also bequalitative (e.g. the content of pictures posted on a social media network).Measures have to be selected as early as possible in the evaluation process. This is toensure that measures can be taken before, as well as after, the operation starts. Gathering validretrospective measures is hard to do and often constrains the evaluator to use measures whichare not ideal.Measures are valid to the extent that they actually represent what is being measured. Thisunwieldy notion is known as construct validity.Put colloquially, your measure is valid only ‘if it means what you think it means’.
As one can imagine, in a social world construct validity is often a lot harder to achieve thanin the natural world. What we think of as ‘data’ comes bundled with all kinds of assumptions.Think of what might seem like a straightforward measure, such as official statistics ofrecorded crime. Do crime statistics reflect the amount of crime that takes place, or do theyreflect the decisions that police make about the crimes that should be recorded? What does anincrease in recorded crime tell us? That more crime incidents took place, or that, for whateverreason, more victims chose to report incidents this quarter? More data are needed to figure thisout. Now consider the problem of measuring individual attitudes. We need some conceptualdefinition of what an attitude is. We then need an operational (measurable) definition. We needa tool to operationalise the definition; for example, a survey, which has to ‘translate’ with fidelityour operational definition into a series of questions. We need to demonstrate that the questionswe have chosen actually capture our initial concept of ‘attitude’.We have to consider carefully the conditions in which the survey is administered. Perhapswe have captured something else, such as the desire to please the administrator of the survey(by providing the answers the respondent thinks the survey administrator wants to hear).Perhaps our questions were too suggestive of what we expected the response to be. Perhaps ourinitial conceptualisation was erroneous and what we have measured is something other than‘attitude’ entirely. Perhaps a survey wasn’t even the right tool. A growing number of socialresearchers are coming to question whether surveys tell us much of any use at all. Many
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criminologists do not use them, preferring tools such as psychometric tests or structuredinterviews.
A rule of thumb: the more ‘remote’ the measure is from the phenomenon we are actually
interested in, the less valid it is likely to be. (Think of how inaccurate and embellished a story canget the further removed it is from the original storyteller.)In some circumstances, however, one may have no choice but to rely on ‘proxy indicators’.Geocoding Google users’ searches for ‘flu symptoms’ in order to track the spread of aseasonal flu epidemic is one example of using a proxy indicator. A cleverly designed proxy canspare a lot of effort. In this example, the alternative would be to call all general practices andhospitals to gather daily estimates in order to follow the progress of the epidemic in real time.This would be quite the undertaking. We could also track how many doses of the flu vaccine arebeing ordered and where they are being shipped, but remember our crime statistics example:vaccine orders may reflect policy decisions more than they do epidemic progression. Think backto all the vaccines that went unused during the swine flu pandemic of 2009. If a clever proxy isavailable, the loss of information may be worth it.Devising valid measures is the main challenge of impact measurement. What willconstitute a valid measure is wholly dependent on how the problem has been defined (e.g. arewe trying to influence ‘attitudes’ or are we trying to influence ‘behaviour’ – the first may be apoor proxy for the second, much like citizens’ beliefs about the amount crime that takes placeare a poor proxy for actual crime rates).Because the choice of measure will guide the choice of data collection method (e.g.carrying out surveys, conducting interviews, harvesting Google analytics), devising measuresearly allows us to plan for the evaluation activity as soon as possible. Linking measure selectionto problem analysis means that measures can be designed to keep track of unintended orundesirable consequences. Part of that process will involve drawing a line beyond which effectswill not be monitored. Total monitoring of operational effects in open systems is, of course,unachievable.The chosen measures should remain the same throughout the evaluation, to rule out thepossibility that any change uncovered is due to the change in measurement techniques, insteadof a real effect.
Unfortunately, there is no sure-fire way of devising valid measures, which have to balancepractical considerations with a ruthless questioning of assumptions. Trade-offs are inevitable,but should be scrupulously justified and documented. Data shouldn’t be collected ‘for the sake ofit’, without any idea of what it has to say. ‘Data’ are not the same as ‘measures’, much like‘information’ isn’t intelligence until it has been analysed.Finally, if official data is used, evaluators need to be familiar with the protocols throughwhich it was collected. This includes the use of survey data, such as reports from the Pew GlobalAttitudes Project.
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‘How did we do it?’ Establishing accountabilityKeeping track of what an operation actually entailed is a neglected component of evaluations,yet it is a critical part of the evaluation package. Evaluators must hold a faithful record of theoperation’s outputs: who did what, how and when?If an operation involved putting out messages over Twitter, how many went out, whenwere they posted, and who wrote them? If ads were run in the paper, when were they actuallyrun, on what page, next to which article? What do we know about the paper’s circulation and theprofile of its readership? Why did we pick this newspaper in particular? If the plan was topartner with a civil organisation, did they actually contribute? If not, why?All of these details are needed to contextualise the evaluation’s findings; to come up withan explanation why particular elements of the operation have failed or succeeded (e.g. lack ofcultural awareness, failure of technology, enthusiasm of the local commander for the project,unexpected support from local authorities); and how one might do better (or as well) next time.It may have been a great idea, but poorly executed. Perhaps the budget was insufficient, orconditions on the ground changed unexpectedly, and the operation had to be terminated toosoon, despite the fact that it was beginning to show promising results.It is not possible to rely on the original plans for the operation to answer these questions.This is, of course, because the saying ‘no battle plan survives contact with the enemy’ alsoapplies to influence operations, though one might rephrase it as:
No plan for an influence operation can survive implementation in an open social system.
‘Did we do it?’ Attributing responsibility for changeThe next order of business is to establish whether or not the operation’s activities caused any orall of the fluctuations revealed by measurements. Assuming the problem has been reduced, wewant to find out whether the operation can take the credit. This means meeting criteria forcausality and ruling out threats to causal attribution.To make the case that the changes (i.e. outcomes) observed are attributable to theoperation, it must be demonstrated that:
 the operation’s activities are associated with the change(s). This is a matter of
statistical association. Statistical analysis of the variation between outputmeasures (measures of operational activities) and outcome measures(measures of change) must show that both sets of measures correlate.
Association, however, is not enough to demonstrate causality, because therelationship could, theoretically, go both ways. The outcome could be causingthe output. (This seems counter-intuitive, but consider the relationshipbetween crime and police activity. Statistically, it might look like an increaseof police activity is causing a rise in crime rates. Causally, a plausibleexplanation is that as the crime rates rise, the police respond by doing morelaw enforcement.)
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Output measures should include measures of intensity17. More activity shouldbe associated with more change to strengthen the case that variation in theoutput is responsible for variation in the outcome.
 the operation’s activity precedes the change in the outcome measures. This is amatter of temporal ordering. Causes always precede their effects. To add to thecase for causal attribution, it is necessary to demonstrate that the outcomedidn’t change before the operation even started. This is why takingmeasurements before implementation is absolutely necessary. This is also whyit is necessary to plan the evaluation at the outset, while the operation is stillbeing designed.
 the changes weren’t caused by something else. This is a matter of ruling out
rival causes. This chiefly involves putting in place controls, so that one canestimate what would have happened had the operation not taken place (inscientific terms, we need to establish the counterfactual) and compare itagainst what did take place once the operation was implemented. It involvesruling out all sorts of threats to the integrity of the evaluation’s design.
This is quite possibly the hardest thing for any evaluation to achieve. Itrequires the evaluators to come up with a whole list of other factors, whichcould have been responsible for the change, and rule them out one by one,which is rarely attempted in practice.
 the fact that the operation’s activities is responsible for the change is the most
plausible out of all other possibilities, given the points above. This is a matter ofestablishing plausible mechanisms which could have caused the activities toeffect a change in the outcome.
17 See Bowers et al. (2004) for a technical discussion of intensity measures.
67
There exists any number of threats to causal attribution. Some are threats to statistical
validity, which undermine the search for a statistical relationship between outputs andoutcomes; this can be because the sample of cases to evaluate is too small, or because animproper statistical technique has been used.
Table 2 Threats to internal validity
Threat Explanation
History The effect is caused by something that would have happenedanyway, even if the operation hadn’t taken place (e.g. due to‘seasonal effects’), or by some other event taking place at thesame time as the operation (e.g. a counter-influence effort).Selection The effect reflects pre-existing differences between experimentaland control group, or the fact that the target population wasspecial in some way and particularly susceptible to influence.Maturation The target population had started to change anyway because ofnormal processes (e.g. the process of ‘growing up’) and wouldhave continued to do so, even without the operation.Measurement The choice of measures, or the act of measurement itself, isresponsible for the change (e.g. the same construct was capturedusing different measures before and after the operation).Statistical regression Also known as regression to the mean. The operation wasimplemented because the problem or issue was particularly bad.Things that are particularly high or low tend to naturally returncloser to a normal state. In other words, even without theoperation, an increase (or decrease) in the outcome measurewould have taken place because of normal fluctuation.Attrition Also known as mortality. Evaluations often start with samples ofa certain size, but participants drop out for varying reasons alongthe way. Attrition is a threat if those who drop out are differentfrom those who stay the course, in a way that explains the effect(e.g. those who stayed were committed to change).Direction of causation It is not possible to establish whether an operational output iscausing an outcome, or vice-versa.Diffusion Populations, groups, or individuals that were not targeted aresomehow influence by the operation anyway (e.g. through theoperation of social networks). This is a problem if they are part ofthe control population.Source: Adapted from Tilley (2009) and Welsh and Farrington (2006).
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Others are threats to internal validity, which undermine the case for attribution of causalresponsibility to the operation. Common threats to internal validity are listed in Table 2.
‘What did we learn?’ Providing grounds for generalisationIf all we wanted was to show that the operation had an impact, we might stop there, but thepurpose of an evaluation is to provide a knowledge-base upon which to improve future activity.Above all, planners want to know: ‘If it worked this time, will it work again?’
Different approaches to evaluation have different strategies for dealing with this problem,as previously discussed. There are, broadly speaking, two ways to tackle it:
1. One can conduct many evaluations of the same operation implementedin different contexts (minimising as much as possible the variation inoutputs between implementations), then subjecting the findings to asystematic review and statistical meta-analysis18. This is the strategyadvocated by the evidence-based tradition.
2. For each operation evaluated, one can conjecture associations betweenmechanisms and contextual features responsible for the outcomesobserved, based on analysis informed by the scientific knowledge-base,as well as the evidence generated by the impact and processcomponents of the evaluation; if the next operation, informed by theseconjectures, performs well, this is a test of generalisability. This is thestrategy advocated by the realist evaluation tradition, as well as thesystemist approach put forward in this report.
18 See Welsh and Farrington (2006) for further discussion.
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Whatever strategy is employed, there are any numbers of threats to external validity(generalisability). The main threats are listed in Table 3.
‘Was it worth it?’ Calculating costs and benefitsResources aren’t infinite, especially in the current economic context. Policy decisions adjudicatethe judicious use of resources and, therefore, will require evidence about ‘value for money’.Hence, evaluations often include an element of cost-benefit analysis (CBA).This is, broadly speaking, a matter of calculating two types of costs – the cost of theproblem which the operation is aiming to prevent or reduce, and the cost of the resources which
Table 3 Threats to external validity
Threat Explanation
Setting attributes The settings in which people develop and behave have characteristics
which can vary significantly from one environment to the next. These
characteristics may play an important role in allowing the effect of the
operation to come about.
Target attributes The characteristics of the populations, groups or individuals can vary
significantly from one environment to another. These patterns of
variation in target characteristics may be important in terms of the effect
which was brought about.
Systems attribute The features of the systems (composition, environment, structure,
mechanism) in which target populations, groups or individuals are
embedded will differ from one theatre to another. These differences may
have a crucial role to play in the achievement of the objective.
Implementer attributes The nature and characteristics of the people (commanders, analysts, front-
line staff, agency) who implement the operation can vary from one
operation to the next. These characteristics may be important in relation
to the effect achieved.
Partner attributes The characteristics of mediators or other partners (e.g. local authorities;
media platforms) who actively assist the implementers in delivering the
operation’s activities will also vary. These variations may also play a part
in the eventual outcome.
Dosage The intensity with which the operation’s activities are implemented and
delivered differs between target populations or target settings. These
variations in intensity may be important in explaining the effect achieved.
Source: Adapted from Tilley (2009)
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are required to design and implement the operation – in order to come up with the amount ofmoney saved by the operation (or not).In practice, this is a complicated exercise, which requires good data, accounting expertise,and the imagination to develop cost measures for what are often intangible items, such aspsychological costs and benefits, diplomatic or reputational gains, and so on. A sophisticatedCBA will use measures of intensity of inputs and outputs to estimate thresholds at which returnsdiminish19.
Choosing an evaluation design: Robustness vs. flexibilityHow does one choose an evaluation design among the diversity of options available toevaluators? The answer might seem obvious enough: whichever design can answer thequestions and deal with the thorny issues outlined so far in this section.
We want a design that:
 measures operational impact accurately;
 captures the inputs and outputs of the activity faithfully;
 eliminates the greatest number of impediments to the establishment of causal
attribution (the threats to internal validity; see Table 2), as confidently as
possible;
 provides an understanding of the processes involved in producing the outcome,
including the circumstances in which these mechanisms are likely to work again
(by ruling out threats to external validity; see Table 3).Of course, this is easier said than done. If one kind of design were known to achieve allthis, there would be no need for this report.Since such a panacea doesn't exist, the possibilities are as follows. Each has its own prosand cons.
Randomised control trials
Pros. RCTs are the best evaluation designs when it comes to ruling out rival explanations with ahigh degree of confidence (as long, of course, as they are well-administered).Randomised experiments, like their names indicate, allocate treatment (the measuredelivered by the operation) on a random basis to some targets or sites, but not others. The onesnot treated serve as a control group.
19 See Farrell et al. (2005) for a technical discussion of CBA.
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In both groups, quantitative measurements are taken before and after the implementationof the treatment to evaluate effects. Random allocation ensures that members of the treated andcontrol groups do not differ in any other way than whether or not they have received thetreatment. Comparing treated and untreated units allows the evaluator to measure the effects ofthe treatment, and only the effects of the treatment.If the effects are shown to be significant (after statistical analysis), then the conclusion isthat the operation under evaluation, and only the operation, can be responsible for thedifferences observed between treatment and control groups. RCTs score high on internalvalidity. In other words, they are best fit to tackle the challenge of attribution.
Cons. Before one can carry out an RCT, certain conditions have to be met. Chief amongthese conditions is that of independence between the members of the population participating in
the trial. In short, there should be no link or tie between the members that could be responsiblefor spreading the effect of the treatment. Treating individual A should have no effect onindividual B. This is important, since, for obvious reasons the randomly assigned control andtreatment groups must remain independent of each other - or the ability to attribute treatmenteffects with confidence goes up in smoke.Now let’s consider OIAs. In many cases, the IO seeks to exploit precisely the existence ofties between individuals. For example, it wants to diffuse a message among the members of asocial network, counting on the fact that the members targeted initially will ‘contaminate’ therest. Let’s imagine that one wants to implement an RCT to evaluate the effectiveness ofembedding agents of influence in online forums where radicalising activity is known to takeplace. The agents are tasked with carrying out scripted counter-radicalising activities (e.g.‘friending’ forum members; subtly providing alternative viewpoints)20. The forums are identifiedand some are allocated counter-radicalising agents, while others are left alone. Activity ismonitored in both groups of forums using the exact same indicators or metrics, for the sameperiod of time.At the end of the evaluation exercise, could one conclude with a high degree of confidencethat a noticeable difference in the amount of radicalising activity between the groups wasattributable to the operation? Critics could make a reasonable case that, given the very nature ofonline radical networks, it is not possible to rule out that the members of one group interactedwith the others, unbeknown to the evaluators. Given the nature of online identities, it may evenbe that some of the same individuals were present in both groups, under different pseudonyms!On top of the condition of independence, which is incredibly hard to achieve in permeable,online social systems, there must also be a sufficient number of similar cases to assign randomly to
both treatment and control groups.In the above example, that means enough forums need to be identified, with similarstructures, composition and environment, and the same sort of radicalising activity taking placein all of them. This is a tall order. In some cases, the circumstances of an intervention are sounique or specific that randomisation is simply impossible to consider.
20 The author thanks Manuel Eisner for providing this hypothetical sketch of an RCT.
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As a rule, RCTs thrive on homogeneity. They do better when the members of thepopulation targeted are roughly similar, rather than when each of them is characterised by a setof unique or special circumstances. This preference for uniformity increases statisticalconfidence (it supports confident attribution; the answer to ‘did we do it?’), but it underminesthe ability to generalise (the answer to ‘what did we learn?).
As Nick Tilley (2009:168) puts it:
“The populations from which cases are randomly assigned [by RCTs] are always, and
inevitably, spatio-temporally specific. It cannot logically be concluded that just because an effect is
produced among one group at one place and time, it will be experienced in another group at
another place and time. This may not matter, in practice, where groups can be assumed to be
invariant in relevant respects. But it does matter if this assumption cannot plausibly be made.”
Tilley concludes,
“In relation to offenders, victims and offending the assumption of invariance is, at best, highly
contestable!”
One can make the case that the same objection will apply to targets of IAs. Short of a
knowledge-based argument that two populations are similar in all the ways that matter, theconclusions of one RCT cannot be transferred over to a new case with confidence.As the proponents of RCT themselves recognise, the only way to establish whether theeffect of an operation is generalisable or replicable in different conditions is to carry out a lot ofRCTs in different settings, then subject the findings to systematic review and meta-analysis.However, to achieve a high level of confidence over the verdict of the evaluation, RCTs
require a high level of control over the environment in which the evaluation activity (and therefore
the operation) takes place. Randomisation, homogeneity…these are artificial conditions, whichmay be hard to set up in practice. Therefore, carrying out enough RCTs to make a systematicreview worthwhile may demand a significant amount of resources and time.
To sum up: RCTs are high-precision tools. Used proficiently, they are highly reliable andcan provide robust estimations of the net effects of an operation. The trade-off is that they areintrusive and require specialised training to design and administer. They also work best underconditions which influence activities might be unable to meet. RCTs work best in small, closedsystems, with single-measure operations aimed at a well-defined population. While RCTs tacklethe challenge of attribution effectively, they do less well against the problem of generalisation.Accounting for the intrinsically open-system nature of OIAs is a tough experimental challenge tomeet.
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Quasi-experiments
Pros. Quasi-experiments (QEs) are designs which try to emulate an experimental approach in
situations where RCTs cannot be administered.These types of designs are often employed in the evaluation of place-based interventions(for example, evaluating the effectiveness of installing alley-gates to prevent residential burglaryin a neighbourhood). The logic of using a control group to compare against the treatment groupand estimate the size of the intervention’s effects remains the same. Sometimes the ‘control’ isthe treated population itself – one simply turns the intervention on, then off, then on again andcompares effects over time (this usually requires that the operation go on over a long period).The closer the control and treatment groups can be matched, and the greater the numberof measurements taken over a period of time before and after implementation of the operation,the higher the internal validity of the results – in other words, the stronger the confidence in thedesign’s ability to attribute causal responsibility to the operation for any change.As a rule, QEs are less intrusive than RCTs; they impose fewer artificial conditions andrequire fewer assumptions, hereby avoiding some of the hurdles to generalisation set up bymore stringent experimental designs.
Cons. Quasi-experiments cannot make the same claims to internal validity as RCTs (theydo not meet the challenge of attribution as well), though well-crafted QEs can come very close.Because cases are not assigned randomly, they cannot rule out that some other differencebetween treatment and control group is responsible for changes observed, other than theintervention under evaluation. And because they assume that they have succeeded in selecting awell-matched, but independent set of control cases, they face the same difficulty as RCTs whenoperating in open social systems – how to ensure that the control group is not affected by theintervention applied to the treatment group, while still similar enough to the treatment group tobe of use?Neighbourhood-based designs encounter this issue when trying to rule out displacementeffects (i.e. the possibility that the problem has been ‘pushed over’ to another area as a result ofintervention in the treated neighbourhood). For this reason, immediately-adjacentneighbourhoods aren’t picked as controls. But the further away the control area is located, themore likely it will differ in some (possibly significant) way from the treatment zone, herebycompromising the integrity of the comparative design. Once again, this issue is likely to be ofspecial relevance to the evaluation of OIAs.As will be obvious from this brief description, QEs, like RCTs, require experience andexpertise to design and administer effectively. For this reason, the quality of QEs can varywidely, from sophisticated, multiple-group interrupted time-series designs to simple, small-areabefore/after set-ups, which struggle to rule out rival explanations.The ability to meet the attribution challenge varies according to the level of sophisticationof the QE.
To sum up: Well-designed QEs can come close to RCTs as far as tackling the challenge ofattribution, but in turn they face much of the same problems regarding their ability to deal with
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open systems (i.e. intervention and comparison groups must be assumed to be completelyindependent from one-another). Designing robust QEs can be, to some extent, even more of achallenge than designing robust RCTs. They are, however, more flexible and less intrusive thanrandomised experiments.
Non-experimental designs
Pros. The pros and cons of non-experimental designs are more difficult to synthesise, as thiscategory houses wildly differing approaches, including simple after-only designs (which onlytake measures after the intervention), retrospective before/after designs, cross-sectional studies(for example, comparing survey data across different countries using statistical analysis),longitudinal studies, and qualitative designs.The appeal of non-experimental designs is that they can adapt to the environment inwhich the operation is conducted, as well as to the resources available to the evaluators(including levels of staffing and training).
Cons. These designs struggle to rule out rival explanations, because they cannot controlfor the many factors which could be responsible for the changes observed. They are also unableto deliver precise estimates of the effect of the operation – the sort of estimates one might needto calculate costs and benefits.Nevertheless, realist evaluators, who claim no allegiance to a particular design, will arguethat non-experimental designs can serve a valuable purpose, as long as they are guided byhypotheses about the context-mechanism-outcome (C-M-O) configurations at work in theintervention.They would not, for example, assume the need for randomisation; indeed they might saythat purposeful sampling is called for to test hypotheses about which competing mechanismsare likely to be responsible for change at particular sites or among particular kinds of people.They would also see a role for qualitative methods (e.g. focus groups) in evaluation design.
To sum up: Non-experimental designs come in many shapes and vary wildly in theirrobustness. They can never claim to deal with the problem of attribution effectively. However,given their versatility and low level of intrusiveness, they may have their place in a strongly
theory-guided evaluation, as a means of investigating specific hypotheses about the effect ofparticular mechanisms in particular contexts.
Process evaluation designsProcess evaluation designs are add-ons to other types of designs. They document how theoperation was implemented and what did or did not go according to plan. (A note: things thatdon’t go according to plan are not necessarily bad things; adjustments ‘on the fly’ may beresponsible for a positive outcome – all the more reason to keep track of them.)Process evaluations keep track of inputs, activities, procedures and timelines. They caneven record the state of mind of the implementers – their perspective on what went wrong (or
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right). They do not, however, include measures of outcomes, and therefore are not used tomeasure effects. Their main purpose is to establish accountability.
They can also strengthen attribution and diagnose the causes of failure. If the plan wasfollowed to a T, a stronger case can be made that the operation was responsible for the outcome;conversely, if the plan wasn’t followed, then there’s no call to blame the idea behind theoperation for its failure (see Table 4). Process evaluations will also play a crucial role inestablishing the mechanism(s) at work, allowing the evaluators to draw generalizable lessonsfrom the evaluation.There are no obvious trade-offs involved in conducting process evaluations, with theexception that they add a layer of administrative accountability to an operation.
To sum up: In combination with an outcome measurement design, process evaluationsprovide support for conclusions regarding both attribution and generalisation.
Table 4 Interpreting results of impact and process evaluations
Process Evaluation Results
Operation implementedas planned, or nearly so Operation notimplemented as planned,or in a radically differentmanner from what wasplanned
Impact
Evaluation
Results
Objectiveachieved This is ground to thinkthe operation asplanned was a success This suggests that otherfactors may beresponsible for success,that the operation was‘accidentally’ successful,or that success was dueto adaption of theoperation on the groundObjective notachieved This is ground to thinkthat the operation wasineffective, and thatsome other kind ofoperation should betried
There is little to learnhere. If the operation hasbeen implemented asplanned, it might havebeen successful, but it’snot possible to say fromthis evaluationSource: Adapted from Eck (2005)
76
In the next section, the argument is put forward that designing evaluations to deal withattribution and generalisation is necessary, but not sufficient to support the development ofeffective IAs. Evaluations and operations are technological, not scientific, endeavours, andeffective technologies must above all be sensitive to user needs.The choice of evaluation design can only be the result of an exercise which balances optimallythe demands of attribution, generalisation and usability.
Further readingEck, J.E. (2002). Assessing Responses to Problems: An Introductory Guide for Police Problem-
Solvers (Updated 2011). Problem-Solving Tool Series. Community Oriented Policing Services,U.S. Department of Justice. Available from:http://www.popcenter.org/tools/assessing_responses/Tilley, N. (2009). Crime Prevention. Cullompton: Willan.Clarke, R.V. and J.E. Eck (2005). Crime Analysis for Problem Solvers. In 60 Small Steps.Washington, D.C.: Office of Community Oriented Policing.Sampson, R. (2010). “Gold Standard Myths: Observations on the Experimental Turn inQuantitative Criminology.” Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 26: 489-500.Welsh, B.C. and D.P. Farrington (eds.) (2006). Preventing Crime: What Works for Children,
Offenders, Victims, and Places. New York, NY: Springer.
SECTION 9
Recasting evaluation as a
technological endeavour:
Overcoming the problem of usability
Evaluation design, like
operation design, is a
technological endeavourAs should now be clear, a thread of tensionruns through CP between evidence-basedand realist philosophies, between tacklingthe problem of attribution and thechallenge of generalisation; betweenreaching for scientific validity andmaximising policy relevance.This schism isn’t unique to CP. Thesame tug-of-war takes place in otherdisciplines concerned with translatingscientific knowledge into action, such aspublic health or management science. Thefriction is more pronounced in areas wherethe scientific knowledge-base is stillmaturing, and where no unifying theoriesor models of explanation dominate, as is thecase in the influence domain. Whilescientific knowledge production in thephysical and natural sciences is cumulative,elsewhere it is competitive, new theorieschallenging older frameworks and new
“The real breakthrough came when
tested technological rules could be
grounded on scientific knowledge
(Bunge, 1967), including law-like
relationships from the natural sciences.
For instance, one can design an
aeroplane wing on the basis of tested,
technological (black box) rules, but such
wings can be designed much more
efficiently on the basis of tested and
grounded technological rules, grounded
on the laws and insights of
aerodynamics and mechanics.”
Van Aken (2004), on the reasons behind
the success of the engineering
disciplines
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problems being studied from the ground up.Does this mean, then, that the evaluation of IAs is condemned to struggle with the self-same tension between basic and practical knowledge, scientific robustness and usability?
The answer is yes.This is not, however, an insurmountable problem.Indeed, the case can be made that if the conflict seems intractable, it is only because theproblem has been stated improperly.
Despite what the discourse of evaluators in CP and cognate fields might suggest, the role ofevaluation is not to establish the validity of a scientific truth. That is a job for the scientificmethod.Indeed, evaluation cannot be a test of a scientific theory or hypothesis, because the objectof the evaluation – the operation – ‘incarnates’ much more than scientific constructs. It alsoembodies all manner of assumptions regarding the nature and the causes of the problem to betackled, the specifications of the desired outcome, the principles to follow in order to designsolutions, and the tools to use in order to implement them.IOs are not conducted for the purpose of scientific research, but for their own ends. Ergo,what evaluations assess are the effectiveness of a course of action and of the means chosen tocarry it out. It follows that evaluation is a technological matter, rather than a scientific one.
Dixit Mario Bunge (2001):
“Technology is the sector of human knowledge concerned with the design and redesign,
maintenance, and repair of artificial systems and processes.” Hence, “[f]acing a practical problem,
taking responsibility for it, and reflecting on the best means to solve it under the known constraints
and in the light of the available knowledge and resources, may be regarded as a technological
problem.”
Here, then, is an explanation for the troublesome tension between different schools ofthought in CP and other domains of social action: evaluation is framed as a scientific enterprise21– to be shaped by the philosophy and logic of science, the concerns and standards of science, andthe methods and tools of science – when in fact it is a technological undertaking.
Why does this distinction matter?Because technologies, even though they are best built upon the knowledge-base producedby the basic and applied sciences, are not the outcome of a scientific process. They are the
21 See, for example, Pawson, R. (2003). “Assessing the quality of evidence in evidence-based policy: why, how
and when?” ESRC Research Methods Programme. Working Paper N˚1. Available from: 
http://ccsr.ac.uk/methods/projects/buxton/Pawson.pdf.
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product of engineering22. And engineering has its own logic, concerns and tools, shaped to suitits particular ends.There is a fundamental difference between testing a new treatment and evaluating itsimplementation in a clinical setting; between testing a new drug and assessing the impact of itsrelease into the population – the ways it might end up being prescribed by medicalprofessionals, used or misused, and the reasons why.Likewise, there is a fundamental difference between testing a psychosocial theory of
influence and evaluating an operation built upon its principles and implemented under ‘battle
conditions’.
Building confidence in OIAs requires an R&D programmeRecasting the issue in this way has very concrete implications for the development of robustevaluation frameworks, usable evaluation designs, and efficient IOs.It means, first and foremost, that effective evaluation technologies – and, inextricably,influence technologies – will be the product of a research and development (R&D) process.Indeed, the R&D process leading to evaluation technologies is, logically, a sub-process in a largerR&D programme leading to efficient influence technologies.
Evaluation is merely one of the stages of the problem-solving cycle, familiar to clinicianseverywhere:
1. Identifying the problem and its boundaries
2. Analysing the problem to uncover causal factors and causalprocesses
3. Formulating a solution
4. Designing an intervention
5. Implementing the intervention
6. Evaluating the outcome
7. Making recommendations
For the purpose of this discussion, the R&D process23 can be broken down into thefollowing steps:
Statement and analysis of a practical problem
22 Mistaking engineering for science is a common category error. For example, we speak of ‘rocketscientists’, when we really should speak of ‘rocket engineers’. There is no such thing as a ‘rocket scientist’.See Petroski (2010).
23 Adapted from Mario Bunge’s analysis of the ‘technological method’.
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Identification of a problem-relevant knowledge-domain 
Synthesis of relevant basic and applied scientific laws or mechanisms

Synthesis of relevant design principles, rules and methods
Invention of technological rules grounded in the knowledge synthesised

Outline of the object or process (artefact), which will act upon the
problem
Detailed blueprint
Testing (alpha and beta)
Blueprint revision
Dissemination of grounded and field-tested technological rules
As Mario Bunge (2001) remarks, this process “is similar to the scientific method, except that
technological tests are tests for efficiency rather than truth.”This is precisely the heart of the matter.When we evaluate an operation, we are not trying to establish whether a scientific theoryis correct (i.e. ‘true’), but whether a chosen course of action (which can be represented by theconfiguration of its goals, means, outcomes and side-effects) was the right one.The last step in the R&D process, the dissemination of grounded and field-tested
technological rules, is there to ensure that those who have to decide on future courses of actionsdo not have to start from scratch, in the same way that clinicians do not start from scratch witheach new diagnosis, but draw from diagnostic and treatment rules accumulated over time,through the evaluation of clinical practice.
Translating S-M-O patterns into technological rulesThe technological rules which result from R&D are general. In other words, they are applicableto a family of problems, not just to a specific incident or event (e.g. a ‘patient’), which is whatmakes the process worthwhile.
As defined by Mario Bunge (1967:132), a technological rule is
“an instruction to perform a finite number of acts in a given order and with a given aim.”
As Joan van Aken notes, there are two kinds of technological rules. Algorithmic rulesdeliver a predictable result following the completion of a specified number of steps.Pharmacological rules which specify how much of a drug to administer relative to the patient’sweight are algorithmic. By contrast, heuristic rules have to be translated to be made relevant tothe practical problem at hand. So while algorithmic rules are of the form ‘To achieve X in
81
situation Z, do Y,” heuristic rules are of the form “To achieve X in situation Z, do something like
Y.” Needless to say, the kind of rules likely to be produced by a R&D programme in theinfluence domain will be heuristic in nature. There are no recipes for influence.
As van Aken further observes (2004):
“The indeterminate nature of a heuristic technological rule makes it impossible to prove its
effects conclusively, but it can be tested in context, which in turn can lead to sufficient supporting
evidence” (emphasis added).
Hence, technological rules are best field-tested through multiple case-study designs,where the cases belong to the same problem family. The effectiveness of the course of action(the operation) is itself a test of the technological rule upon which it was designed.But field-testing is only one part (though an essential one) of the validation process. On itsown, field-testing yields ‘black-box’ statements, of the kind ‘yes, this works’ or ‘no, it doesn’twork,’ sans explanation. Grounding technological rules in scientific knowledge – the laws andcausal relationships uncovered by research in basic and applied sciences – is also essential.We return to the need to supplement empirical findings with accounts of the plausiblemechanisms which underpin the results. To ‘technologise’ operations and their evaluation is notto deny their scientific grounding, but to recognise that they are not, and cannot, be shaped bythe scientific knowledge-base alone.
The technological rules produced by R&D activity will address both the nature ofproblems and their solutions, and the tools or processes used to put them into action.
1. In the first instance, they will formalise the System-Mechanism-Outcomepatterns uncovered by the evaluation into heuristic rules of the type ‘To
achieve an outcome of the kind OX in a system of type SY (with composition
CY, Environment EY, Structure SY, and/or Mechanism MY), employ a measure
of type mZ to activate a mechanism of the kind MZ. An added rule mightspecify, ‘To prevent side-effects of the kind SEX, measures of the type mZ
should have characteristic cZ’.
2. In the second instance, the rules will state which tools or means toemploy to assist in the design and implementation of the solution. Forexample, ‘To measure outcomes of type O use scale s’, ‘To design measures
of type m use template t’ or ‘To evaluate operations of class OpW use
evaluation design of kind DW’.
3. In the third instance, evaluation may, in the long run, generate meta-
technological rules about the effectiveness of certain classes of solutionsagainst certain families of problems or in certain families of systems. Metarules may even be uncovered which state, ‘Strategic objectives of the kind
SoX cannot be achieved through influence operations’.
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Towards the ‘routinisation’ of influence technologies: Lessons from
requirement engineeringThe ultimate purpose of R&D activity is to achieve a state where technology can be ‘routinised’;where it can be operated by any trained professional in the field.To use the automobile industry as an analogy, the goal is to get to a situation whereanyone with an appropriate licence can operate a car, not just test pilots and Formula 1 drivers.To get to this point, blueprints and prototypes need to be developed, tested (first in laboratory,then in field conditions), and then revised. As described in the R&D schema outlined previously,problems have to be analysed and clearly stated, and relevant knowledge-domains exploited –the sort of activity carried out in this report.To develop a blueprint, however, one needs more than domain knowledge. Prior todeveloping and designing any solution, engineers elicit requirements.
As stated in systems engineering, requirements can be defined as the functions that a
measure or system must perform, and the range of constraints it must satisfy, in order for the
objective to be achieved to the benefit and satisfaction of the user(s) or problem-owner(s).Well-elicited requirements allow for the optimisation of a technological solution tailoredto the user’s specific operational environment, constraints and objectives.
Functional requirements specify what the system should achieve for the user, and whatfeatures it should have. In the case of evaluation technologies, a functional system or designshould provide the best possible answer to both the questions of attribution and generalisation,given a family of IAs.
Non-functional requirements detail the constraints under which the system is expected tooperate, and the target values that various functions are expected to meet. In the case of OIAs, afunctional evaluation framework might be expected to deal with imperfect sources of data,limited timescales, a given level of training in operators, a user-defined level of confidence inattribution and generalisation findings, doctrinal constraints, cultural mores, and so on.Non-functional requirements must be taken into account to ensure that the system, onceput in place, doesn’t fail due to environmental factors. One example here of non-functionalrequirement failure would be an evaluation design involving multiple randomised controlledtrials, which fails to be implemented because:
 conditions on the ground preclude the required level of control overtrial conditions;
 the evaluation activity encounters resistance among users due to itsintrusiveness, complexity, and lack of adaptability to the terrain;
 the design is unsuited to the nature of the operations being evaluated;
 it requires specially-educated staff;
 it takes too long to deliver results.
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Carrying out R&D activity through systemist formative evaluationsIn an R&D context, a formative approach to evaluation can serve as a productive and flexibleframework and foundation.
Undertaking systemist formative evaluations can help to:
 elaborate well-posed problem statements (i.e. solvable problems, whichare appropriately matched to tactical or strategic objectives);
 pinpoint and synthesise the relevant knowledge-base;
 elicit functional and non-functional requirements;
 set out specifications for influence technologies;
 generate explicit S-M-O configurations;
 delineate the pool of realistic interventions; and
 produce technological rules for the design of future evaluation andimplementation tools.
In other words, a well thought-out package of systemist formative evaluations of IAs couldprovide the foundations of a comprehensive and rational R&D programme for influencetechnologies.Once the programme has delivered grounded and field-tested technological rules, andconfidence in IAs (including OIAs) has been built, a framework for routinised summativeevaluations can be produced, to be integrated into the normal cycle of operation design for useby professionals in the field, in the same way that clinical innovations eventually diffuse topractitioners in clinical settings. Should the need for a new family of IOs arise in future, the R&Dprocess can be undertaken again.Only through such a systematic approach can IO capability-building take place on anorganisational level and deliver substantive, game-changing innovation in influencetechnologies.
The foundations of a systemist formative evaluation process model are laid out in the nextsection of this report. It builds upon the strengths of the evidence-based and realist evaluationmodels, while adding the analytical rigour of the systemist approach and the practical methodsof requirement and design engineering. It is not intended as a definitive ‘recipe’. It will, itself,need to be put to the test of usability. Nevertheless, it offers a next step in the evolution of whatGal McKay and colleagues call a “substantial concept” for IAs, which has been missing to date.
84
Further readingvan Aken, J.E. (2004). “Management research based on the paradigm of the design sciences: Thequest for field-tested and grounded technological rules.” Journal of Management Studies,41(2):219-246.Bunge, M. (1967). Scientific Research. Strategy and Philosophy. Berlin, New York: Springer-Verlag. Reprinted in Bunge, M. (1998). Philosophy of Science. 2 Vols. New Brunswick, NJ:Transaction.Bunge, M. (2001). “The technologies in philosophy.” In M. Mahner (ed.), Scientific realism:
Selected essays of Mario Bunge. Amherst, NY: Prometheus.Van Lamsweerde, A. (2009). Requirement engineering. Chichester: Wiley.
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SECTION 10
A systemist evaluation blueprint for
online influence activities
Designing systemist formative
evaluations for OIAsThis section sets out the foundations of asystemist evaluation process model, to beimplemented as part of a formativeevaluation programme for IOs.As stated, formative evaluations areconducted at the developmental stage of anew kind of activity, when there isinsufficient knowledge about what sorts ofoperations might be effective, or evenwhat, precisely, the activity is setting out toachieve (the problem statement).Formative evaluations encouragestructured self-reflection about the natureof problems and ultimate objectives, aswell as the development of innovativesolutions. The process is very similar togeneral-purpose requirements elicitationprocesses in systems engineering.
Formative evaluations are intensiveexercises. They can be conducted ‘table-top’, though they are most effective whencarried out alongside live operations.Evaluators, designers and implementersmust work closely together to produce a
“Influence has become the ‘must have’
accessory for the battlefield. Good. But
think how difficult it is to influence, say,
your teenage kids, into a particular
course of action. You know them. They
have grown up in your house. You know
the groups they belong to, their
interests, their likes and dislikes. Yet as
every parent knows influencing a 16
year old into a particular course of
action can be difficult.
Now apply this thinking to an Afghan
whom you do not know, who has grown
up in a completely different culture with
different values and beliefs anchored in
a wholly different world from our own.
You want to influence them? Wow! This
is hard stuff to do and whilst the UK’s
capability and understanding has leapt
forward in the last couple of years there
is still much work to do.”
Rowland and Tatham, 2008
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clear picture of problems and objectives, elaborate appropriate responses, resolve conflictingrequirements issues, anticipate implementation hurdles, set up monitoring procedures, andanalyse results, in order to disseminate lessons learned in the form of technological rules.The task of designing and agreeing the formative evaluation process is itself acollaborative undertaking. Evaluators and users must agree what, when and how they are toelicit information out of each other. Given the nature of the formative process, it is ofteniterative, and may require that evaluators and users go back and forth between phases ofelicitation.Hence, what follows can only be taken as a first draft.Since the main aim of the proposed formative evaluation process is to bring to lightspecific kinds of R&D activity needed to deliver and support mature influence technologies,plausible R&D activities are suggested for each phase. However, the list is by no meansexhaustive.
There is, indeed, “still much work to do.”
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Table 5 Blueprint of a systemist formative evaluation framework for IAs
Evaluation Phase Description Associated R&D Activities
Domain scanning Acquisition of general knowledge of the area and circumstances inwhich the IO is to be rolled out.
EL
IC
IT
AT
IO
N
O
F
RE
Q
U
IR
EM
EN
TS
Problem statement Elaboration of a problem statement, which :1) is well-posed (i.e. it confirms that the problem exists; itestablishes that the issue identified by the end-user is indeedthe problem, instead of, for example, a symptom; it defines theproblem specifically enough that there is confidence thateveryone shares the same understanding);2) ascertains that the problem identified is solvable in ameasurable way;3) provides a clear picture of the who, what, where, when, how ofthe problem;4) specifies clearly how the problem or issue is related tooverarching goals (e.g. strategic aims), and its relativeimportance5) establishes clear aims and objectives for the IO;6) is agreed with the problem-owner and end-users.
 Design and validate tools andtechniques to guide problemstatement elicitation and visualrepresentation.
Problem analysis Identification and collection information on the stated problem, andanalysis data, in order to:1) narrow the scope of the problem;2) assess existing responses to the problem, if any have already
 Design and validate tools andtechniques to guide and structureproblem analysis.
 Conduct systemic literaturereviews and syntheses of
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been implemented;3) acquire and synthesise the relevant knowledge-base;4) identify the causes and markers associated with the problem atall relevant levels of analysis;5) formulate working hypotheses as to what the key causes of theproblem are and what factors or processes might bemanipulated to effect change.
behaviour-change research incognate and commensurateproblem domains, in order toexpand the knowledge-basebeyond attitude-based models ofinfluence.For an example of a systemicsynthesis, see Bouhana andWikström (2011), where amultilevel, systemic model of thecauses of radicalisation is producedfrom the synthesis of disparatestudies of Al-Qaeda-influencedradicalisation.
Target systemic
analysis
Systemic analysis of the IO’s target (eg. individual, group, community,society), with attention to each of the four systemic components: C(composition); E (environment); S (structure), and; M (mechanisms),in order to uncover, notably:1) key systems in which the target is embedded, and theircharacteristics;2) influence pathways (bonds and mechanisms) between thetarget and the systems to which it belongs, which can beexploited by the IO;3) existing sources of influence, which may or may not have acompeting agenda and should be either exploited orcountered by the IO.
 Design and validate tools to guideand structure target systemicanalysis.
S-M-O hypotheses Generation of System-Mechanism-Outcome configuration hypotheses,based on the findings of the problem and target systemic analyses.  Design and validate tools to guideand structure the formulation of S-M-O hypotheses.
 Synthesise literature in cognate and
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commensurate problem domains toextract and catalogue documentedor theorised S-M-O configurations.This activity can be carried out aspart of the systemic synthesesdescribed above.
Measure design Design of the specific measures or activities (ie. interventions) whichthe IO will implement, given the S-M-O hypotheses.Measures should be designed to activate one or more mechanisms,given the systemic features highlighted by the target systemicanalysis and the knowledge-base synthesis carried out during theproblem analysis phase.The design process should make reference to the contextual featuresunder which the measure is expected to activate the hypothesisedmechanism and produce the desired outcome.This includes reference to timing (when the activity should beimplemented and for how long). It is also likely to include referenceto the agent who will enact the activity (as the source of influence islikely to be a ‘key ingredient’).
 Design and validate tools to guideand structure the design ofactivities.
IO context analysis Elicitation of information about the IO and its environment, with theaim to establish:1) the personnel who will implementing the IO (their number,location, training, and so on);2) the actors whose collaboration may be required to implementthe operation (‘green’ forces, businesses, NGOs, civiliangroups, and so on);3) the IO’s timeline (eg. how long can the IO run; when areresults expected; is it consistent with what the knowledge-base is the time needed for influence to take effect);
 Design and validate tools to guideand structure the operation contextanalysis and the elicitation ofoperation specifications.
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4) the IO’s environment (including chain of command) and anyother implementation constraints the IO will have to contendwith (including constraints on evaluation activity);5) the specifications which must be met before the IO getsunderway (eg. human, material and technical resources),given all of the above;6) whether any of the activities or measures previously designedmust be adapted or refined given operational constraints.
IO blueprint Design of the IO, based on the synthesis of requirements elicited up tothis point, taking into account specifications relative to the measuresto be implemented and to the context in which the operation will becarried out.
 Design and validate tools to guideand structure the design of theoperation blueprint, such asoperation matrices or templates.
Evaluation design Design of the evaluation, taking into account the IO’s blueprint and allelicited requirements and corresponding specifications.The design should contain both process and outcome evaluationcomponents.Given implementation constraints and user needs, the choice ofevaluation design (experimental, quasi-experimental, non-experimental) and evaluation metrics should balance optimally:1) attribution;2) generalisation;3) analysis;4) usability.
 Design and validate tools to guideand structure the design ofevaluations, such as design guides,checklists, templates, andcatalogues of best-practiceexamples in cognate andcommensurate domains.The purpose of these tools must beto facilitate the collaboration ofevaluators and users, in order toproduce an evaluation designwhich handles trade-offs betweenthe four challenges of evaluation inan optimal way.
Testing - Alpha Assessment of the operation blueprint and evaluation design usingtable-top methodology.This is akin to ‘red teaming’. The purpose is to troubleshoot andrefine the IO and evaluation design before implementation in the
 Design and validate alpha-testingmethodology.
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field, as well as anticipate unintended outcomes of the activity.
Testing - Beta Implementation and evaluation the IO against one (or a series of) testfield-cases.  Design evaluation data collectionand storage system.
Process and outcome
evaluation synthesis
Aggregation and interpretation of the evaluation findings into thefollowing products:1) synthesis of the findings of the process and outcomeevaluations (ie. interpretation of the IO’s impact in terms ofcontext; eventual diagnosis of implementation of theoryfailure);2) validation or invalidation of S-M-O hypotheses;3) systemist synthesis of findings in the event of multiple casestudies;4) derivation of general technological rules from the synthesis.
 Design and validate methodologiesand tools for evaluation synthesisand the formulation ofstandardised evaluation products.
Dissemination of
technological findings
Dissemination of the conclusions of the formative evaluation in theform of:1) heuristic rules of influence;2) heuristic rules of implementation;3) analytical tools;4) standardised evaluation designs;5) training materials and other documentation of lessonslearned and best practice.
 Design and validate disseminationprocesses, including training.
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SECTION 11
Conclusion: What future for
influence activities?
The author was tasked with outlining thefoundations of a framework for the evaluationof OIAs – a first step towards building greaterconfidence in the effectiveness and value of IAsconducted in a military context.The task was taken a little further. Thisreport presents the barebones of an R&Dprogramme, in reconnaissance that all four
challenges of evaluation – attribution,
generalisation, analysis, and usability – must be
tackled if influence technologies are to becomemore efficient and more reliable.
Nevertheless, this is not the only possibleway forward. It would be perfectly feasible toimplement a more modest approach toevaluation, of the kind outlined in the NATOreport cited earlier on, concerned with thedesign of functional MoEs rather than with theevaluation of the systemic logic of IOs.Without going to such a theory-freeextreme, one could adopt the pragmatic,‘realism-lite’ approach embodied by theProblem-Solving Tools series published by theUS Centre for Problem-Oriented Policing. In“Assessing Responses to Problems,”criminologist John Eck provides CPpractitioners with a basic introduction to thelogic of realist evaluation, as well as techniques
“Even during wars of national survival or
the destruction of WMD, conflict will
remain focused on influencing people.
The battle of the narratives will be key,
and the UK must conduct protracted
influence activity, coordinated centrally
and executed locally.”
Development, Concepts and Doctrine
Centre, 2010
“Progress in human affairs, whether in
science or in history or in society, has
come mainly through the bold readiness
of human beings not to confine
themselves to seeking piecemeal
improvements in the way things are
done, but to present fundamental
challenges in the name of reason to the
current way of doing things and to the
avowed or hidden assumptions on which
it rests.”
E.H. Carr, 1961
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of response-assessment, including some standard, minimally intrusive evaluation designs.It would not take too much work to adapt such a guide to the needs of practitioners in theOIA domain – though suitable MoEs would have to be trialled. To say that nothing of value wouldbe gained from implementing even a basic approach to evaluation would be disingenuous, if onlybecause there is an inherent benefit to the introduction of practices that encourage self-reflection on the part of operation designers. Too many courses of action are undertakenwithout a clear idea of what the goals are or what success would look like.
However, this is not the approach to take if one is aiming for capability-building on anysignificant scale. Whether such capability-building is desirable is, of course, a question fordoctrine and policy-making – a discussion to which this author, a criminologist naive in thesematters, has little to contribute.That said, if it is proposed – as one might gather from publications such as the DCDC’s The
Future Character of Conflict – that IAs should play a larger part in the overall context of UKoperations, then a more ambitious agenda is called for.If “protracted influence activities” are indeed the endgame, then they must be supported bya substantial and rational R&D programme, in the same way that support for kinetic operationsrequires large-scale R&D programmes. No one thought twice about the need for R&D in order toadapt to new battlefield tactics (such as the proliferation of improvised explosive devices), toimprove battlefield medicine, or to counter new and emerging cyber-threats.Yet, as Gal McKay and colleagues point out, IOs are still conducted at the same level oftechnological development which characterised operations ninety years ago.
The R&D logic advocated here is the same logic which has motivated development in otherareas of operations. Functioning, reliable, cost-effective influence technologies capable of long-term strategic deployment cannot be developed ad hoc.The key question is ‘How important is it to build confidence in IAs?’, followed by itscorollary, ‘How do we ensure that this confidence is, and remains, well-placed?’
This report has drawn from experience in CP to make the case for a systemist approach toevaluation. As stated at the outset, the point was not to claim that CP evaluators have it allfigured out; instead, the idea was to capitalise on weaknesses as well as strengths, building onthe latter while proposing constructive ways to address the former.As this reports hopes to have shown, there is ground to stand on between rigorous, butimpractical scientific evaluation designs; realist, but analytically fuzzy frameworks; and ad hoc,low-maintenance, but unreliable assessment tools.As per the advice of historian H.E. Carr, this ground was uncovered by questioning the
“hidden assumptions” upon which rest not only evaluation activities, but social interventionsmore generally, of which CP and IAs are two instances:
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1. The assumption that two of the functions of evaluation activity(establishing attribution and providing grounds for generalisation)should supersede the requirement of usability; and
2. The assumption that evaluation, and to some extent the activities beingevaluated, should be treated as scientific undertakings, with all thephilosophical and methodological trappings this entails.
As to the first assumption, the argument was put forward that usability is just asimportant as attribution and generalisation, because what is unusable will not, by definition, beput to use, in which case concerning ourselves with the problems of attribution andgeneralisation is moot.As to the second, the case was made that to treat evaluation and influence activities asscientific products is to commit a category error. They are technologies and should be handledas such, meaning that their development and assessment should be part of a full problem-cycle,which includes the elicitation of user requirements.
Taking an engineering approach to influence technologies will, inevitably, lead toconfronting other (more or less hidden) assumptions and to the formation of recommendations,some of which are already actionable:
1. It will challenge the idea that operation designers can go straight totheoretical models and empirical research in the basic or appliedsciences – such as social psychology, social networking or decisiontheories – and put these findings to use without further ado.To do this is to ignore the fact that, while engineers build uponestablished scientific principles, they also bring to bear a body ofknowledge unique to their own discipline: an understanding of systemsand design principles, which is not contained within the scientificcorpus itself, but is validated through engineering’s own methods andprocesses.Science is about understanding, while engineering is aboutproblem-solving. Without the application of latter, the former cannot
deliver efficient action.It takes more than knowledge of the laws of physics to build abridge, and it takes more than psychological principles, behaviouralmodels or decision theories to design IOs.
Recommendation: When commissioning, soliciting or turning
to the products of research and theoretical development in the
human and social sciences in the context of OIAs, keep in mind that
these products need to be assessed against user requirements,
both functional and non-functional, as would any other new
technological system, prior to implementation.
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2. Rigorous problem analysis and the subsequent synthesis of relevantknowledge-bases are likely to challenge the received wisdom that IAsare and should be chiefly about changing ‘attitudes’. A shift towardsmulti-level, integrated behavioural models is likely to take place, toreflect the state-of-the-art in the behavioural sciences. The notions ofbehavioural change which underpin current thinking on influence havetheir roots in thirty-year-old literature and need a significant update.New models are needed which articulate developmental causes ofpropensity acquisition as well as situational causes of behaviour, takinginto account social ecological and systemic (contextual) processes.Importantly, not all ‘theories of influence’ or ‘behavioural change’are equal or can be of use to inform influence activity. The assumptionsupon which influence models are based in some domains, such as inmarketing communication, are significantly different from those thatunderpin influence operations, which should caution users againstimporting techniques from other field wholesale.R&D activity may reveal ultimately that investment in basicscience is required before influence models fit to drive OIAs can emerge.It is here that experimental designs are most likely to benefit theknowledge-base.
Recommendation: Commission systemic syntheses of the
literature on behavioural change in commensurate domains, which
reflect the state-of-the-art in social environmental and ecological
science, social cognitive neuroscience, and other systemic
understandings of human behaviour, in order to generate new
analytical frameworks for IO design, which do not rely on outdated
attitude-change models.
3. Finally, a systemist outlook can only challenge expectations, if anyremain, that IOs can achieve their objectives regardless of what goes on‘in the field’. In open social systems, actions are as loud as words, if notlouder.
Recommendation: Building confidence in IAs also means
managing expectations of what they can achieve.
As far as the approach proposed here, the next stage is to subject the draft of systemistevaluation process model to further development, alpha-testing and fine-tuning. As it is itself atechnology, it needs to be adapted to the requirements, mores and values of the userorganisation. Once a prototype is ready, it may be piloted upon planned, or, if impractical,historical or simulated IOs, as a whole or in part.
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This would constitute first a step towards devising a coherent R&D programme forinfluence technologies. Whether that course of action is desirable is not for the author to say.The present report can only aim to inform that decision.
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